

Churchill's Dark Side

To What Extent did Winston Churchill have a Dark Side
from 1942-1945?

Abstract

Winston Churchill is considered to be 'one of history's greatest leaders; without his leadership, the outcome of World War II may have been completely different'¹. This received view has dominated research, subsequently causing the suppression of Churchill's critical historical revisionist perspective. This dissertation will explore the boundaries of the revisionist perspective, whilst the aim is, simultaneously, to assess and explain the extent Churchill had a 'dark side' from 1942-1945.

To discover this dark side, frameworks will be applied, in addition to rational and irrational choice theory. Here, as part of the review, the validity of rational choice theory will be questioned; namely, are all actions rational? Hence this research will construct another viewpoint, that is irrational choice theory. Irrational choice theory stipulates that when the rational self-utility maximisation calculation is not completed correctly, actions can be labelled as irrational. Specifically, the evaluation of the theories will determine the legitimacy of Churchill's dark actions. Additionally, the dark side will be assessed utilising frameworks taken from Furnham et al², Hogan³ and Paulhus & Williams's dark triad⁴; these bring depth when analysing the presence of a dark side; here, the Bengal Famine (1943), Percentage Agreement (1944) and Operation

¹ Matthew Gibson and Robert J. Weber, "Applying Leadership Qualities Of Great People To Your Department: Sir Winston Churchill", *Hospital Pharmacy* 50, no. 1 (2015): 78, doi:10.1310/hpj5001-78.

² Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

³ Robert Hogan, "Reflection On The Dark Side", *Hogan Assessments*, 2014, accessed April 23, 2019, http://info.hoganassessments.com/hubfs/Reflections_Dark_Side_R1.pdf?t=1445677671.

⁴ Delroy L. Paulhus and Kevin M. Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

Unthinkable (1945) will be the focus. The research will argue that Churchill acted rationally during the Bengal Famine and Operation Unthinkable, although irrationally throughout the Percentage Agreement.

Overall, the events highlighted should have had significant implications upon his received perspective. Nonetheless the *light side* has been considerably elevated; thus, these actions will continue to suppress Churchill's legacy to a small degree. This dissertation will illustrate how, to a greater extent, Churchill did in fact have a *dark side*.

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Introduction

Winston Churchill, when you hear his name, there are instantaneously images, connotations and associations; frequently, focused on British identity, iconic heroism,

rhetoric, 'bulldog spirit'⁵, leadership, Iron Curtain, the famous V for Victory⁶ and World War Two saviour. For instance, in 2002, a poll for the BBC asked who was the Greatest Briton of all time? Churchill won with 447,423 votes⁷, therefore emphasising his immense popularity and relevance. However, infrequently negative connotations are associated with Churchill, particularly in the public domain and especially in the West, despite some of his actions arguably being questionable and deplorable. This dissertation's objective is to test these boundaries and the validity of Churchill's revisionist perspectives to comprehend if they can, or should, encroach on his received perception.

Churchill in the contemporary is perpetually relevant and being exploited for ulterior motivations. For instance, Boris Johnson⁸ is politically motivated when drawing similarities between Brexit and Churchill's defiance of Hitler⁹. Additionally, Churchill's image has been utilised by *Brexiters* to show the electorate Britain's strong and powerful imperial past, without the European Union. However, Churchill was pro-

⁵ "How War Sapped Winston Churchill's Bulldog Spirit", *The International Churchill Society*, accessed April 22, 2019. <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/in-the-media/churchill-in-the-news/how-war-sapped-winston-churchills-bulldog-spirit/>.

⁶ "Newswatch", *BBC News*, accessed April 22, 2019. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/newswatch/history/noflash/html/1940s.stm>.

⁷ "Churchill Voted Greatest Briton", *BBC News*, 2002, accessed April 22, 2019. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/2509465.stm>.

⁸ Boris Johnson, *The Churchill Factor* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2015).

⁹ Harry Yorke, "Boris Johnson Likens Brexit Dilemma To Churchill's Defiance Of Hitler", *The Telegraph*, 2018, accessed April 23, 2019. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/12/06/boris-johnson-likens-brexit-dilemma-churchills-defiance-hitler/>.

European and one of the first advocates of a 'United States of Europe'.¹⁰ for the prolongation of peace and prevention of future wars, through international co-operation. Furthermore, the 2018 award-winning film, 'The Darkest Hour'.¹¹, eulogised Churchill by creating factually fallacious fictionalised scenes.¹² to positively enhance Churchill's received view. In summary, Churchill is still very relevant and of great interest. This dissertation will evaluate if Churchill should be praised as high as a 'prophet'.¹³ or as low as Hitler.¹⁴ and Stalin.¹⁵.

Overall, the research aim of this dissertation is to assess and explain the extent Churchill had a 'dark side' from 1942-1945. Thus, qualitative research will be carried out by analysing predominantly revisionist literature with historical and case study

¹⁰ "The Founding Fathers Of The EU", *European Union*, accessed December 7, 2018. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/founding-fathers_en#box_4.

¹¹ Joe Wright, *The Darkest Hour*, DVD (Perfect World Pictures, Working Title Films, 2018).

¹² Jon Greenberg, "Fact-Check: Darkest Hour Movie Gets Churchill Mostly Right", *Politifact*, 2018, accessed April 24, 2019. <https://www.politifact.com/truthometer/article/2018/feb/26/fact-check-darkest-hour-movie-winston-churchill/>.

¹³ Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill Volume 5: The Prophet of Truth, 1922-1939* (Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 2009).

¹⁴ Maya Oppenheim and Shashi Tharoor, "Winston Churchill Is No Better Than Hitler, Says Indian MP", *The Independent*, 2018, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-history/winston-churchill-adolf-hitler-no-better-shashi-tharoor-indian-politician-post-colonialist-author-a7641681.html>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

methods. The dark side will be established through the frameworks of Furnham et al.¹⁶, Hogan.¹⁷ and Paulhus & Williams's dark triad¹⁸, in combination with Smith's rational choice theory¹⁹. Notably, agents can be rational whilst showing a dark side, which legitimises the chosen frameworks. Economic decision models are not dependent on moral worth. The main criticism of rational choice theory is not all social phenomena are reducible to rationality²⁰, as many actions do not adhere to the self-utility maximisation process. Thus, this dissertation will extend rational choice theory to argue that its criteria are not always strictly obeyed; Churchill's actions can be classified as irrational²¹. Irrational choice theory is the 'negative version'²² of rational choice. This amalgamation is a unique concept and will bring value to the research.

¹⁶ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

¹⁷ Robert Hogan, "Reflection On The Dark Side", *Hogan Assessments*, 2014, accessed April 23, 2019. http://info.hoganassessments.com/hubfs/Reflections_Dark_Side_R1.pdf?t=1449605677671.

¹⁸ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

¹⁹ Adam Smith, *The Theory Of Moral Sentiments*. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981).

²⁰ Michael I. Ogu, "Rational Choice Theory: Assumptions, Strengths, and Greatest Weaknesses In Application Outside The Western Milieu Context", *Nigerian Chapter Of Arabian Journal Of Business And Management Review* 1, no. 3 (2013): 90-99, doi:10.12816/0003628.

²¹ Milan Zafirovski, "Beneath Rational Choice: Elements Of 'Irrational Choice Theory'", *Current Sociology* 61, no. 1 (2012): 3-21, doi:10.1177/0011392112465872.

²² Ibid.

This dissertation will involve formalising a literature review, focused upon questioning what Churchill's light side consists of and why this has been elevated, before assessing literature regarding the three main case studies. Afterwards, an explanation of rational and irrational choice theory and dark side frameworks will be followed by assessing Churchill's role in impacting the Bengal Famine (1943), Percentage Agreement (1944) and Operation Unthinkable (1945). These will explain the extent of Churchill's accountability, whilst debating if his actions were justifiable and important. All these specific events are within a three-year time-frame to enable increased precision and clarity, particularly as Churchill's ideologies and context varied considerably during his lifespan. Additionally, these case studies are also chosen to enable a global perspective of Churchill. This research will bring value to the academic sphere, as these events have not been evaluated and compared in tandem. Finally, after analysis, this research will draw conclusions if Churchill's dark side encroaches upon his received sanitised perception.

Literature Review

Literature often portrays Churchill as an extraordinary near mythical man, whilst applying minimal or total neglect to his negative aspects. Consequentially, literature often becomes narrowly focused and misconstrued with inadequate evaluations,

arguably due to Churchill's 'reputational entrepreneurship'²³, shown in his profound words, "History will be kind to me for, as I intend to rewrite it"²⁴. Subsequently, this has caused his actions to be elevated within his personal literature, including *Triumph and Tragedy*²⁵. Furthermore, Churchill's son recently conceded that his father misled people, particularly in his timeline of events, including in the *Gathering of the Storm*²⁶, which seemingly could have been called 'one-man war'²⁷. Moreover, Churchill's narrative infringed upon the common narrative, through rhetorical and literary devices, which elated certain aspects and excluded others, for the objective of increasing his stardom status²⁸. Therefore, many of his actions have been misconceived, misinterpreted, hidden and exaggerated in secondary literature, causing a strong emphasis on his positive side.

²³ Richard Toye, "The Churchill Syndrome :Reputational Entrepreneurship And The Rhetoric Of Foreign Policy Since 1945", *The British Journal Of Politics And International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2008): 364-378, doi:10.1111/j.1467-856x.2008.00323.

²⁴ John Martin, "Winston Churchill's Cold War", *Library Of Congress*, 2003, accessed April 21, 2019. <https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0301/churchill.html>.

²⁵ Winston Churchill, *Second World War: Volume VI Triumph And Tragedy* (London: Cassell & Company, 1953).

²⁶ Francis Neilson, "Winston Churchill's War Memoirs", *The American Journal Of Economics And Sociology* 8, no. 2 (1949): 193-208.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 194.

²⁸ David Reynolds, *In Command Of History - Churchill Fighting And Writing The Second World War* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

Before analysing the historical revisionist perspective, it is necessary to establish and contrast this with the received orthodox perspective²⁹. Even after World War Two, Churchill was referred to as the 'greatest ever Englishmen'³⁰. Churchill's speeches have been universally admired³¹, for example his Iron Curtain speech (1946), arguably marking the Cold War's beginning³². Additionally, his famous words, "We shall fight them on the beaches"³³ (1944), which united, rallied and amassed patriotism against Germany, with a 'never surrender'³⁴ ethos. Moreover, these speeches have been imbedded within the British culture identity and society. However, Cannadine argues his speeches were not always convincing or successful³⁵. Nevertheless, Manchester

²⁹ Frederick Suppe, "Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment Of Developments, 1969-1998", *Philosophy Of Science* 67 (2000): 102-115, doi:10.1086/392812.

³⁰ Paul Addison, "The Three Careers Of Winston Churchill", *Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society* 11 (2001): 183-99.

³¹ Winston Churchill, *Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches* (New York: Hachette Books, 2003).

³² Klaus Larres, "Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech in Context: The Attempt To Achieve A 'Good Understanding On All Points' With Stalin's Soviet Union", *The International History Review* 40, no. 1 (2017): 86-107, doi:10.1080/07075332.2017.1298531.

³³ Aileen Moreton-Robinson and Fiona Nicoll, "We Shall Fight Them on The Beaches: Contesting Cultures Of White Possession", *Journal Of Australian Studies* 30, no. 89 (2006): 149-160, doi:10.1080/14443050609388100.

³⁴ William Manchester and Paul Reid, *The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Defender of The Realm, 1940-1965* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012), 1-2.

³⁵ David Cannadine, *In Churchill's Shadow: Confronting the Past In Modern Britain* (London: The Penguin Press, 2002), 102.

suggests Churchill led the world to defeating Nazi Germany³⁶, whereas Buchanan argues Churchill caused World War Two³⁷. Moreover, Addison purports Churchill was not a British hero, but a hero of Western Europe and the English-speaking world³⁸, and remembered for his 'volcanic energy, physical and mental courage, eloquence and vision, humanity and wit'³⁹. Overall, the received view focuses on Churchill's rhetoric, his leadership and determination in World War Two.

Alternatively, a historical revisionist⁴⁰ perspective of Churchill is evident in the Bengal Famine (1943), where Churchill arguably was responsible for millions of deaths. Mukerjee suggests Churchill orchestrated the Famine by prioritising British citizens' food supplies by diverting food ships and his denial policies⁴¹. Similarly, Dr Tharoor states Churchill was no better than Stalin and Hitler⁴², because of his role in the

³⁶ William Manchester and Paul Reid, *The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Defender of The Realm, 1940-1965* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012).1-51.

³⁷ Patrick Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler And the Unnecessary War* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2008), xix.

³⁸ Paul Addison, "Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer", *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 2014, doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/32413.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Anita Shapira, "The Strategies Of Historical Revisionism", *Journal Of Israeli History* 20, no. 2-3 (2001): 62-76, doi:10.1080/13531040108576159.

⁴¹ Madhusree Mukerjee, *Churchill's Secret War* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 68.

⁴² Maya Oppenheim and Shashi Tharoor, "Winston Churchill Is No Better Than Hitler, Says Indian MP", *The Independent*, 2018, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-history/winston-churchill-adolf-hitler-no-better-shashi-tharoor-indian-politician-post-colonialist-author-a7641681.html>.

Famine. Gilbert claims otherwise by contending Churchill did the best he could in the midst of war⁴³. Furthermore, many argue for ulterior factors. For instance, Tauger suggests the responsibility lies with the 1942 poor harvest⁴⁴ and Sen proposes the wartime economic boom⁴⁵, whilst Mitra advocates nutritional improvements⁴⁶. Instead Herman situates culpability to the local officials⁴⁷, but according to Padmanabhan⁴⁸ the Brown Spot Disease was liable⁴⁹. However, Churchill asserts responsibility lies with Indians⁵⁰, due to his racist imperialism⁵¹. Therefore, this shows there is no conclusive argument for the Bengal Famine and ascribing Churchill's agency is problematic. Hence, this dissertation will adjudicate Churchill's role comparatively with other factors, before evaluating whether there are contradictions to his received view.

⁴³ Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: The Churchill Documents Volume 19* (Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 2006), 43-66.

⁴⁴ Mark Tauger, "The Indian Famine Crisis Of World War II", *The British Scholar* 1, no. 2 (2009): 166-196.

⁴⁵ Amartya Sen, *Poverty And Famines: An Essay On Entitlement And Deprivation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 52-83.

⁴⁶ Asok Mitra, *India's Population* (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1978), 37.

⁴⁷ Arthur Herman, "Absent Churchill, Bengal's Famine Would Have Been Worse", *Hillsdale College*, 2017, accessed April 21, 2019. <https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/churchills-secret-war-bengal-famine-1943/>.

⁴⁸ S. Padmanabhan. "The Great Bengal Famine," *Annual Review of Phytopathology* 11 (1973), 11-24.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁰ Scott Michael Rank, "Winston Churchill's Childhood", *History on The Net*, accessed April 9, 2019, <https://www.historyonthenet.com/winston-churchills-childhood>.

⁵¹ Janam Mukerjee, *Hungry Bengal Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and The End Of Empire*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 75.

Also, a historical revisionist perspective of Churchill is visible in his actions during the Percentage Agreement (1944); however, its importance is debatable. Comparatively, to the Bengal Famine, Churchill had complete agency, as he personally proposed the percentage document; therefore, disputably representing a historical revisionist stance⁵² to his heroic sanitized narrative. Nevertheless, Carlton stipulates this was the only method to negotiate with Stalin⁵³. Also, there is conflict over whether this arrangement was justifiable. Morgenthau proposes the agreement secured Greece, which was crucial for geo-strategic, economic imperialism⁵⁴. Bugaric however claims Churchill merely wanted to limit Soviet territorial expansionism⁵⁵, but also constrain future communist threats emphasised by Yergin⁵⁶. Debatably, he jeopardised American relations by disobeying Roosevelt⁵⁷ for the objective of limiting British decline⁵⁸. Thus, there are controversies in literature for the reasoning of the

⁵² Richard J Evans, *Lying About Hitler: History, Holocaust, And The David Irving Trial*. (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 56.

⁵³ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 115-117.

⁵⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace* (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1993), 71.

⁵⁵ Max Kuhelj Bugaric, "Birth Of The Cold War", *UCLA Historical Journal* 25, no. 1 (2014), 44.

⁵⁶ Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 178.

⁵⁷ Albert Resis, "The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement On The Balkans, Moscow, October 1944", *The American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (1978): 368, doi:10.2307/1862322.

⁵⁸ Daniel S Margolies, *A Companion To Harry S. Truman* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 306-323.

Percentage Agreement. Henceforth, this dissertation attempts to establish if Churchill's actions can be seen as justifiable. Additionally, their significance is debated. Roberts⁵⁹ and Kolko⁶⁰ argue the agreement was overrated and merely practical. However, most historians concur the arrangement was extremely significant, including Naimark⁶¹ and Jenkins⁶², primarily because a Soviet sphere of influence was cemented. Therefore, an analysis of importance is required to comprehend if Churchill's actions could challenge his received view.

Another controversial event, supporting the historical revisionist stance, is Churchill ordering of Operation Unthinkable. Literature, similar to the Percentage Agreement (1944), but incongruent with the Bengal Famine (1943), confirms Churchill had complete agency. Hence Churchill's role is conclusive, conversely Operation Unthinkable's justifiability is debatable. Moreover, Kitchen argues Churchill's ideological detest for Russia and Stalin and an ingrained sense of historical distrust were his motivations⁶³. Although Francis purports Churchill's proposal was due to his

⁵⁹ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War To Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 218.

⁶⁰ Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics Of War* (New York: Pantheon Book, 1990), 145.

⁶¹ Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History Of The Cold War: Volume 1, Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 175.

⁶² Roy Jenkins, *Churchill* (Pan Books: London, 2002), 759.

⁶³ Martin Kitchen, "Winston Churchill And The Soviet Union During The Second World War", *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 02 (1987): 415, doi:10.1017/s0018246x000215

warmongering⁶⁴, whilst Hasegawa specifies territorial expansion⁶⁵. Hastings argues Churchill needed to plan for an American European departure to prevent Soviet European domination⁶⁶, whereas Lerski stresses the significance and protection of Poland to Britain⁶⁷. Thus, Churchill's justification is inconsistent in literature. Furthermore, Walker⁶⁸ states the document was hidden in a draw. However, Costigliola explains the travesties caused by World War Two for Britain⁶⁹ meant the plan was unrealistic but suggests this was a Cold War trigger⁷⁰. Surmising, the importance is inconclusive, hence this dissertation will attempt to make a credible adjudication.

To assess and conclude the validity of the revisionist perspectives, this dissertation will question if Churchill had a dark side present whilst evaluating if his actions were rational or irrational choices. Brooke stated, "I wonder whether any historian of the

⁶⁴ Alan Francis Brooke, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, *War Diaries, 1939-1945* (London: Phoenix, 2003).

⁶⁵ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviet Policy Toward Japan During World War II", *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 52, no. 522-3 (2011): 245-272, doi:10.4000/monderusse.7533.

⁶⁶ Max Hastings, *Winston's War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 22.

⁶⁷ Jerzy Jan Lerski, Piotr Wrobel and Richard Kozicki, *Historical Dictionary Of Poland, 966-1945* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 634.

⁶⁸ Jonathan Walker, *Operation Unthinkable* (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2017), 159.

⁶⁹ Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 336.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

future will ever be able to paint Winston in his true colours”⁷¹. There is no academic literature explicitly concerning Churchill’s dark side, excluding non-academic articles. However, Vaughan claims scholars have studied the dark side for some time⁷², but not always by name. Literature commonly only uses the dark side in the title, whilst never establishing the components. Moreover, when researching the dark side there is an absence of explanation from a political perspective, whereas plentiful information applied towards the psychological and business realms. Specifying and analysing the dark side from a political perspective will provide a nuance to the research. Additionally, Rogowski asserts rational choice theory is the most rigorous⁷³ and most general theory of social action that has been advanced this century and Moe claims rational choice has been taken ‘by storm’⁷⁴. Subsequently, there is substantial literature. Comparatively, minimal has been written on irrational choice theory. Zafirovski⁷⁵ succinctly provides the foundations of the theory. Overall, there is an aperture for choice theories to be applied to Churchill, which this dissertation will develop.

⁷¹ Alan Brooke and Alex Danchev, *War Diaries, 1939-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 451.

⁷² Diane Vaughan, "The Dark Side Of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, And Disaster", *Annual Review Of Sociology* 25, no. 1 (1999): 272, doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.271.

⁷³ Ronald Rogowski, *Rational Legitimacy: A Theory Of Political Support* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1- 45.

⁷⁴ Gary Shapiro, "The Rise Of Rational Choice", *The New York Sun*, 2006, accessed April 8, 2019, <https://www.nysun.com/arts/rise-of-rational-choice/39433/>.

⁷⁵ Milan Zafirovski, "Beneath Rational Choice: Elements Of ‘Irrational Choice Theory’", *Current Sociology* 61, no. 1 (2012): 3-21, doi:10.1177/0011392112465872.

In conclusion, literature concerning Churchill is often distorted without a neutral balanced analysis due to his personal literature reporting inaccuracies or exaggerations, resulting in logical fallacies of jumping to conclusions⁷⁶ in secondary literature. Therefore, this dissertation's exploratory research will assess the extent the revisionist view can challenge the received perceptives, through the Bengal Famine, Percentage Agreement and Operation Unthinkable. The Bengal Famine literature has controversies over Churchill's reasoning and role whilst the Percentage Agreement and Operation Unthinkable justifiability and importance is diverse in literature. Additionally, all these case studies have not been evaluated together, as a focus of a revisionist analysis. Moreover, rational and irrational choice theories, in combination with the dark side on an actor has not been researched, before in the academic sphere.

⁷⁶ Bo Bennett, *Logically Fallacious* (Boston: eBookIt.com, 2013), 146.

Theoretical Framework

To establish the extent of Churchill's dark side an outline of the utilised frameworks is necessary. Furnham et al, from a psychological perspective, identifies the dark side as people seeking or interested in recognition, power, hedonism, affiliation, tradition, security, commerce and science⁷⁷. On the other hand, Hogan⁷⁸, from a business understanding, focuses on teamwork, stress and derailment, ascribing eleven personality qualities⁷⁹ when taken to extreme⁸⁰, to resemble a dark side; namely, being excitable, sceptical, cautious, reserved, leisurely, bold, mischievous, colourful, imaginative, diligent and dutiful⁸¹. Studies suggest most people show three of these qualities; leaders justify power for an endorsement of their bad traits⁸².

⁷⁷ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 107, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

⁷⁸ Robert Hogan, "Reflection On The Dark Side", *Hogan Assessments*, 2014, accessed April 22, 2019. http://info.hoganassessments.com/hubfs/Reflections_Dark_Side_R1.pdf?t=1449605677671.

⁷⁹ Hwee S. Khoo and Giles St. J. Burch, "The 'Dark Side' Of Leadership Personality And Transformational Leadership: An Exploratory Study", *Personality And Individual Differences* 44, no. 1 (2008): 86-97, doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.07.018.

⁸⁰ Stephen Linstead, Garance Maréchal and Ricky W. Griffin, "Theorizing And Researching The Dark Side Of Organization", *Organization Studies* 35, no. 2 (2014): 165-188, doi:10.1177/0170840613515402.

⁸¹ Robert Hogan and Joyce Hogan, "Assessing Leadership: A View From The Dark Side", *International Journal Of Selection And Assessment* 9, no. 1 & 2 (2001): 40-51, doi:10.1111/1468-2389.00162.

⁸² Thomas Chamorro-Premuzic, "11 Personality Traits That Could Derail Your Career", *Harvard Business Review*, 2017, accessed April 22, 2019. <https://hbr.org/2017/09/could-your-personality-derail-your-career>.

Paulhus & Williams⁸³ dark triad⁸⁴ personality framework provides a credible method for evaluating the dark side. This consists of narcissism (resonating with grandeur, egotism, pride, dominance and superiority),⁸⁵ Machiavellianism (resembling unemotional, manipulative, exploitative, unprincipled and disregard for morality traits)⁸⁶ and psychopathy (characterised by selfish, impulsive, antisocial, remorselessness⁸⁷ and thrill-seeking⁸⁸). Though it should be acknowledged they frequently overlap. Moreover, Daniel expanded the triad to a tetrad with sadism⁸⁹, meaning gaining pleasure from cruelty⁹⁰. Although Jones et al research claims a

⁸³ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

⁸⁴ P.D. Harms, Seth M. Spain and Sean T. Hannah, "Leader Development And The Dark Side Of Personality", *The Leadership Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (2011): 495-509, doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.04.007.

⁸⁵ Nida Corry et al., "The Factor Structure Of The Narcissistic Personality Inventory", *Journal Of Personality Assessment* 90, no. 6 (2008): 593-600, doi:10.1080/00223890802388590.

⁸⁶ Adrian Furnham, Steven C. Richards and Delroy L. Paulhus, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: A 10 Year Review", *Social And Personality Psychology Compass* 7, no. 3 (2013): 199-216, doi:10.1111/spc3.12018.

⁸⁷ Jennifer L. Skeem et al., "Psychopathic Personality", *Psychological Science In The Public Interest* 12, no. 3 (2011): 95-162, doi:10.1177/1529100611426706.

⁸⁸ Robert D. Hare, "Comparison Of Procedures For The Assessment Of Psychopathy.", *Journal Of Consulting And Clinical Psychology* 53, no. 1 (1985): 7-16, doi:10.1037/0022-006x.53.1.7.

⁸⁹ Daniel N. Jones and Delroy L. Paulhus, "The Role Of Impulsivity In The Dark Triad Of Personality", *Personality And Individual Differences* 51, no. 5 (2011): 679-682, doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.04.011.

⁹⁰ Henri Chabrol et al., "Contributions Of Psychopathic, Narcissistic, Machiavellian, And Sadistic Personality Traits To Juvenile Delinquency", *Personality And Individual Differences* 47, no. 7 (2009): 734-739, doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.06.020.

weakness is people draw these three concepts subjectively from our personal experiences⁹¹. Furthermore, there are studies arguing there are plentiful benefits of having these traits⁹², however benefits do not mean a dark side is not present. Overall, the study provides an applicable, credible and logical framework to adjudicate Churchill's dark side.

Vaughan stresses that everyone has a dark side and light side⁹³, though there is a variant of where certain actions are situated upon the spectrum⁹⁴. Whereas Fontaine partakes in a dualist approach, arguing the light and dark is dichotomous⁹⁵. For a more in-depth analysis, this dissertation will situate Churchill's on a spectrum, before adjudicating if this level would impact upon his received perspective. The dark side will be, in combination with rational choice theory, provide an ulterior perspective, because actions can be dark but rational.

⁹¹ Scott Barry Kaufman et al., "The Light Vs. Dark Triad Of Personality: Contrasting Two Very Different Profiles Of Human Nature", *Frontiers In Psychology* 10 (2019), doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00467.

⁹² Peter K. Jonason, Norman P. Li and David M. Buss, "The Costs And Benefits Of The Dark Triad: Implications For Mate Poaching And Mate Retention Tactics", *Personality And Individual Differences* 48, no. 4 (2010): 373-378, doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.11.003.

⁹³ John Vaughan, "Everybody's Got A Dark Side", *Medium*, 2016, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://medium.com/@blueshirtjohn/everybodys-got-a-dark-side-a8312604a645>.

⁹⁴ Radosław Rogoza et al., "The Bright, The Dark, And The Blue Face Of Narcissism: The Spectrum Of Narcissism In Its Relations To The Metatraits Of Personality, Self-Esteem, And The Nomological Network Of Shyness, Loneliness, And Empathy", *Frontiers In Psychology* 9 (2018), doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00343.

⁹⁵ Petrus Franciscus Maria Fontaine, *The Light And The Dark* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1995).

Rational choice theory is a normative deductive approach, which will be applied to evaluate Churchill's dark side. Elster states the essence of rational choice theory suggests when faced with several courses of action, people do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome.⁹⁶ Hence, this assumes people comprehend their objective, which does not have to be universally accepted. Specifically, Emerson adds, rational choice consists of evaluating individual acts, as if balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximises personal advantage⁹⁷; a social exchange. Moreover, Abel claims people are methodically individualistic, hence act for optimal self-maximisation, interest, regard and calculation.⁹⁸ Therefore, individuals are decision-makers, whom choose from a range of alternatives that they perceive, to form a structure with a hierarchy of these preferences to benefit themselves the most at the lowest cost (utility maximisers), when evaluating the best action for achieving their goals for the greatest satisfaction.⁹⁹ Furthermore rational agents, when reflecting, align all the preferences logically from the available information in a consistent manner. A criticism is rational choice theory relies on false assumptions¹⁰⁰ but, in

⁹⁶ Jon Elster, "Social Norms And Economic Theory", *Journal Of Economic Perspectives* 3, no. 4 (1989): 99-117, doi:10.1257/jep.3.4.99.

⁹⁷ R M Emerson, "Social Exchange Theory", *Annual Review Of Sociology* 2, no. 1 (1976): 335-362, doi:10.1146/annurev.so.02.080176.002003.

⁹⁸ Peter Abell, "Putting Social Theory Right?", *Sociological Theory* 18, no. 3 (2000): 518-523, doi:10.1111/0735-2751.00118.

⁹⁹ Michael I. Ogu, "Rational Choice Theory: Assumptions, Strengths, And Greatest Weaknesses in Application Outside The Western Milieu Context", *Nigerian Chapter Of Arabian Journal Of Business And Management Review* 1, no. 3 (2013): 90-99, doi:10.12816/0003628.

¹⁰⁰ Aki Lehtinen and Jaakko Kuorikoski, "Unrealistic Assumptions in Rational Choice Theory", *Philosophy Of The Social Sciences* 37, no. 2 (2007): 115-138, doi:10.1177/0048393107299684.

reality, any theory and framework, based on empiricism, will find difficulty to contradict this statement. Moreover, moral worth is no concern, as the maximum benefit is the achievement of the goal.¹⁰¹ This is a strength when assessing Churchill's dark side. Additionally, for rational choice, collective action is difficult, as it justifies free riding, because people can reap the benefits of a group at minimal sacrifice. Therefore, undermining public goods.¹⁰² Consequentially, Olson argues people are more likely to free ride, therefore groups require sufficient valued private incentives to justify collective activity.¹⁰³

A significant criticism of neoclassical rational choice theorists is they reduce all actions, including irrational actions to rationality.¹⁰⁴ Self-sacrifice or everyday occurrences, such as procrastination, are not aligned with maximising self-utility.¹⁰⁵ Bourdieu.¹⁰⁶ claims this separation is unjustifiable.¹⁰⁷ Hence, this dissertation extends the rational

¹⁰¹ Till Grüne-Yanoff, "Paradoxes Of Rational Choice Theory", *Handbook Of Risk Theory*, 2012, 499-516, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_19.

¹⁰² Robert Albanese and David D. van Fleet, "Rational Behavior In Groups: The Free-Riding Tendency", *The Academy Of Management Review* 10, no. 2 (1985): 244, doi:10.2307/257966.

¹⁰³ Mancur Olson, *The Logic Of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965).

¹⁰⁴ Michael I. Ogu, "Rational Choice Theory: Assumptions, Strengths, And Greatest Weaknesses In Application Outside The Western Milieu Context", *Nigerian Chapter Of Arabian Journal Of Business And Management Review* 1, no. 3 (2013): 90-99, doi:10.12816/0003628.

¹⁰⁵ Thiago Ibrahim, "How Does Irrational Choice Theory Affect You?", *Medium*, 2016, accessed April 1, 2019. <https://medium.com/@tpibrahim/how-does-irrational-choice-theory-affect-you-60e5e8b1ff91>.

¹⁰⁶ Pierre Bourdieu and Chris Turner, *The Social Structures Of The Economy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016).

¹⁰⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts Of Resistance* (New York: New Press, 1998), 51.

theory by concurring with Grüne-Yanoff.¹⁰⁸, who argues if rational choice criteria are not consistently obeyed, then actions and agents are subsequently irrational.¹⁰⁹. Vasconcelos proposes irrational choice theory includes a failure to maximise a well-defined benefit or as showing inconsistent preferences.¹¹⁰. Zafirovski stipulates all rational choice behaviour carried out unreasonably is irrational.¹¹¹. Therefore, if Churchill does not legitimately evaluate all the information reflectively, create and weigh a list of alternatives, minimise costs against benefits, act methodologically individualistically (rational egoism), goal orientated and consistent, then he would have made an irrational choice.¹¹². Moreover, irrational choices have the ability to coexist with rational choices.¹¹³. Thus, an extension of rational and irrational choice theory to Churchill can be applied to evaluate if his actions are rational, providing vigour to the research.

¹⁰⁸ Michael I. Ogu, "Rational Choice Theory: Assumptions, Strengths, And Greatest Weaknesses In Application Outside The Western Milieu Context", *Nigerian Chapter Of Arabian Journal Of Business And Management Review* 1, no. 3 (2013): 90-99, doi:10.12816/0003628.

¹⁰⁹ Till Grüne-Yanoff, "Paradoxes Of Rational Choice Theory", *Handbook Of Risk Theory*, 2012, 499-516, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_19.

¹¹⁰ Marco Vasconcelos, Tiago Monteiro and Alex Kacelnik, "Irrational Choice And The Value Of Information", *Scientific Reports* 5, no. 1 (2015), doi:10.1038/srep13874.

¹¹¹ Milan Zafirovski, "Beneath Rational Choice: Elements Of 'Irrational Choice Theory'", *Current Sociology* 61, no. 1 (2012): 3-21, doi:10.1177/0011392112465872.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ P Samuelson, "Where Ricardo And Mill Rebut And Confirm Arguments Of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization", *Journal Of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 3 (2004): 135-146.

The main benefits of the chosen theories are their predictive nature, individual action traceability and ease of evaluation against utility maximisation.¹¹⁴ Therefore, Churchill's phenomena¹¹⁵ can be applied rigorously. Other theories, for instance utilitarianism, do not provide an adequate method, in this case for calculating pleasure and pain,¹¹⁶ plus give an overemphasis on happiness, whilst ignoring special obligations.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, behaviourism neglects the importance of introspectability and mental thought processes for selecting actions.¹¹⁸ The dark side framework, in combination with irrational and rational choice theory, is the most adequate for assessing and justifying Churchill's dark side.

¹¹⁴ Paul Milgrom and Jonathan Levin, "Introduction To Choice Theory", *Stanford University*, 2004, accessed April 1, 2019. <http://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20202/Choice%20Theory.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ Gary Shapiro, "The Rise Of Rational Choice", *The New York Sun*, 2006, accessed April 8, 2019. <https://www.nysun.com/arts/rise-of-rational-choice/39433/>.

¹¹⁶ John Stuart Mill and Roger Crisp, *Utilitarianism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 51.

¹¹⁷ William Godwin and F. E. L Priestley, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice And Its Influence On Morals And Happiness* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 6.

¹¹⁸ "Behaviorism", *Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy*, 2019, accessed April 1, 2019. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/>.

Chapter 1: The Great Bengal Famine

Despite the enormity and importance of the 1943 Bengal Famine, it has become a neglected part of history. Particularly within the West, due to a failure to conform to Churchill's heroic and liberational narrative. Therefore, the ignominy attached to the Bengal Famine has caused historical suppression by the Churchillian received view. Moreover, there are controversies concerning the death rate, ranging from 2.2¹¹⁹–7.5 million¹²⁰; however, the common consensus is around 3 million¹²¹. These discrepancies can be accounted for by the extent scholars are concerned with discrediting Churchill's legacy and difficulties in calculation of a large geographical area. In perspective, comparisons can be made with Hitler who was condemned for the genocide of 6 million innocent Jews¹²². Therefore, if Churchill is regarded as responsible for, or contributed to the Famine, his legacy would be severely tarnished. Hence an analysis of Churchill's agency is necessary. Thereupon, this chapter will analyse justifications and consequences of Churchill's actions, including his ship confiscation and diversion, as well as his denial and scorch earth policies. In contrast,

¹¹⁹ Tim Dyson and Arup Maharatna, "Excess Mortality During The Bengal Famine: A Re-Evaluation", *The Indian Economic & Social History Review* 28, no. 3 (1991): 281-297, doi:10.1177/001946469102800303.

¹²⁰ Lance Brennan, "Government Famine Relief In Bengal, 1943", *The Journal Of Asian Studies* 47, no. 3 (1988): 541, doi:10.2307/2056974.

¹²¹ M Lufakharul Islam, "The Great Bengal Famine And The Question Of FAD Yet Again", *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2007): 421-440, doi:10.1017/s0026749x06002435.

¹²² "The Holocaust", *History*, accessed April 13, 2019, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/the-holocaust>.

ulterior influences, including World War Two, economic and population booms, natural disasters and British Indian mis-governance were arguably out of Churchill's remit. However, Uppal states there is not a single sufficient explanatory framework sufficient for the Famine.¹²³ Overall, this chapter will argue Churchill was a rational agent, though portrayed a dark side to a great extent in the Famine.

Churchill's ship diversion policy was rational and showed his dark side to a small extent. Mukherjee attributed Churchill's ship diversion policies, which ordered food ships, predominantly Australian, directly to Europe for mere storage (170,000 tonnes of food a month.¹²⁴), instead of responding to Bengali pleas (originally 1.5 then 0.5 million tonnes of wheats, before being declined by the war cabinet.¹²⁵). Furthermore, Churchill denied offers of nutritional support from Canada (100,000 tonnes of wheat¹²⁶), Australia and America, because he was not prepared to make available naval vessels for transportation. Therefore, Churchill's rational mental model, here calculating the cost of diverting ships for the Famine, was outweighed by their perceived war value. This demonstrated Churchill's power and affiliation.¹²⁷ to the war effort and ultimately, his dark side. Interestingly, Churchill later forced India to export

¹²³ J.N Uppal, *Bengal Famine Of 1943: A Man-Made Tragedy* (Delhi: Atma Ram, 1984), 87-103.

¹²⁴ Madhusree Mukherjee, *Churchill's Secret War* (New York: BasicBooks, 2010), 126.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Shashi Tharoor, "The Ugly Briton", *TIME*, 2010, accessed April 2, 2019. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2031992,00.html>.

¹²⁷ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

70,000 tonnes of wheat at the height of the Famine, preventing the potential survival of 400,000 people for a year¹²⁸. This shows a Machiavellianism, narcissism and arguably psychopathic¹²⁹ dark side. Langworth, however, suggests this is fallacious and 350,000 tonnes of Australian wheat were in fact shipped to Bengal and Iraqi barley was offered, which Indians refused to eat¹³⁰. This amount was, nevertheless, insufficient¹³¹, but does uncover Churchill's lighter side. Furthermore, he responded to Cherwell's advice of ordering the removal of 60% of merchant ships from the Indian Ocean¹³². Cherwell asserted aid would have minimal impact, nonetheless this was incorrect and influenced by Cherwell's personal racism¹³³. Conversely, Churchill only listened to Lindemann (a confidant and advisor) regarding nutrition redirection¹³⁴. Therefore, Sharp suggests, he was probably¹³⁵ unaware. However, this argument is

¹²⁸ Soutik Biswas, "How Churchill 'Starved' India", *BBC*, 2010, accessed April 3, 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/soutikbiswas/2010/10/how_churchill_starved_india.html.

¹²⁹ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

¹³⁰ Richard Langworth, "Indians Again: No Oscars For Movies About War Criminals", 2018, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://richardlangworth.com/starving-indians-deny-churchill-oscars>.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² M. S. Venkataramani, *Bengal Famine Of 1943: The American Response* (Delhi: Vikas, 1973), 8.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Charles Sharp, "Churchill Not Entirely To Blame For Bengal Famine", *The Guardian*, 2017, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/12/churchill-not-entirely-to-blame-for-bengal-famine>.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

weak, because of the extensive letters and meeting records Churchill received. Overall, Churchill was attempting to make rational choices, based on false empirical assumptions¹³⁶; a limitation of rational choice theory. However, his ship diversion policies portrayed a dark side to a smaller extent, since his decision-making was constrained by war prioritisation; a rational self-interest preference. In addition, declining foreign aid resembles a dark bold action taken to the extreme, according to Hogan.¹³⁷

Arguably, the influence of Churchill's racist imperialist attitude in the Bengal Famine shows a dark side to a great extent, though this was a rational choice. Mukherjee attributes racism, for neglecting Bengalis, meaning victims died passively.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, racial prejudice was not uncommon in society at the time, but still morally incorrect and dark.¹³⁹ Moreover, Churchill's apathy towards Indians, evident with his statement: "I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion.

¹³⁶ Aki Lehtinen and Jaakko Kuorikoski, "Unrealistic Assumptions In Rational Choice Theory", *Philosophy Of The Social Sciences* 37, no. 2 (2007): 115-138, doi:10.1177/0048393107299684.

¹³⁷ Robert Hogan, "Reflection On The Dark Side", *Hogan Assessments*, 2014, accessed April 22, 2019. http://info.hoganassessments.com/hubfs/Reflections_Dark_Side_R1.pdf?t=1449605677671.

¹³⁸ Abhijit Sarkar, "Hungry Bengal: War, Famine And The End Of Empire, By Janam Mukherjee", *South Asian History And Culture* 9, no. 2 (2017): 225-227, doi:10.1080/19472498.2017.1357977.

¹³⁹ Gordon Hodson, Sarah M. Hogg and Cara C. MacInnis, "The Role Of "Dark Personalities" (Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Psychopathy), Big Five Personality Factors, And Ideology In Explaining Prejudice", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 43, no. 4 (2009): 686-690, doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.02.005.

The Famine was their own fault for breeding like rabbits”¹⁴⁰. Wavell, Viceroy of India, claimed that it was more important for Churchill to save the Greeks and liberated countries rather than the Indians.¹⁴¹ Agreeing to this, shows Churchill’s sadistic¹⁴² dark side. Although, Wavell noted Churchill only desired to feed the people fighting¹⁴³, as a rational utility maximiser. However, Langworth highlights Churchill asserted his ‘sympathy was great for the sufferings of the people of India’¹⁴⁴. Arguably, this was merely a public manoeuvre. Churchill seemed irrational; he was stereotyping, not empirically testing values sufficiently and overgeneralising. Churchill was nevertheless self-interested and racist consistently; thus, a rational agent¹⁴⁵. Even Gandhi wrote to Wavell claiming, “I know that millions outside are starving for want of food. But I should feel utterly helpless if I went out and missed the food by which alone living becomes worthwhile.” This suggests Gandhi has a dark side in a similar manner to Churchill,

¹⁴⁰ Maya Oppenheim, "Winston Churchill Is No Better Than Hitler, Says Indian MP", *The Independent*, 2018, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-history/winston-churchill-adolf-hitler-no-better-shashi-tharoor-indian-politician-post-colonialist-author-a7641681.html>.

¹⁴¹ "Did Churchill Cause The Bengal Famine?", *The Churchill Project - Hillsdale College*, 2015, Accessed April 4, 2019. <https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/did-churchill-cause-the-bengal-famine/>.

¹⁴² Daniel N. Jones and Delroy L. Paulhus, "The Role Of Impulsivity In The Dark Triad Of Personality", *Personality And Individual Differences* 51, no. 5 (2011): 679-682, doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.04.011.

¹⁴³ Madhusree Mukerjee, "Was Churchill Responsible For The Bengal Famine?", *Colombian College Of Arts And Science*, 2019, accessed April 1, 2019. <https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/129891>.

¹⁴⁴ Richard Langworth, "Indians Again: No Oscars For Movies About War Criminals", 2018, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://richardlangworth.com/starving-indians-deny-churchill-oscars>.

¹⁴⁵ David Theo Goldberg, "Racism And Rationality", *Philosophy Of The Social Sciences* 20, no. 3 (1990): 317-350, doi:10.1177/004839319002000303.

acting self-interested (rational) with Machiavellianism.¹⁴⁶ Gandhi prioritised personal preferences (independence) over lives (similar to Churchill, whom highlighted war). Summarising, Churchill adhered to the neoclassical rational choice theory¹⁴⁷, maximising his own self-utility, which was founded on racism.

Moreover, Churchill's brutal imperialist approach to the Bengal Famine was irrational and emphasises his dark side to a large extent. In a memorandum, during March 1943, he stated if a concession is made to one country, others will also make demands¹⁴⁸. This is a rational statement; Churchill was self-calculating for utility maximisation of his British self-interest. However, he followed up this statement saying, "they must look after themselves as we have done"¹⁴⁹. Arguably, this is hypocritical and irrational, because of the inconsistencies - Fundamentally, Britain was importing food from colonies, as it was not self-sufficient¹⁵⁰. Moreover, here Churchill's narcissistic and psychopathic (specifically, remorselessness and impulsivity) personality of the dark

¹⁴⁶ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

¹⁴⁷ Milan Zafirovski, "The Rational Choice Generalization Of Neoclassical Economics Reconsidered: Any Theoretical Legitimation For Economic Imperialism?", *Sociological Theory* 18, no. 3 (2000): 448-471, doi:10.1111/0735-2751.00111.

¹⁴⁸ Madhusree Mukerjee, "How Winston Churchill Stole From India For Britain's War", *Quartz India*, 2018, accessed April 3, 2019. <https://qz.com/india/1235178/how-winston-churchill-stole-from-india-for-britains-war/>.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Joanna Blythman, "The Hungry Empire: How Britain's Quest For Food Shaped The Modern World By Lizzie Collingham - Review", *The Guardian*, 2017, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/aug/13/the-hungry-empire-how-britains-quest-for-food-shaped-the-modern-world-lizzie-collingham-review>.

triad is displayed.¹⁵¹ The World Peace Foundation acquits colonialism and imperialism for famines.¹⁵², hence Churchill's approach was common practice. Examples of such include the Bihar Famine (1873–1874), Southern India Famine (1876–1877), Indian Famine (1896–1900). Despite this, imperialism shows Churchill's dark hedonistic, power, tradition and desire for recognition traits.¹⁵³ Churchill's imperialist attitude was based on irrational stipulations and inevitably showed a dark side to a great extent.

Churchill's ability to react, with limited resources during the dynamics of war, justifies his negligence to provide relief actions, meaning his actions were rational and questionably not dark. Brennan et al.¹⁵⁴ argue World War Two led to losses and constraints on normal grain controls and importations. This was exasperated by the sinking of Indian Ocean ships and military demands on internal transport systems. Additionally, Herman explains the real cause was Burma's loss to the Japanese (1942).¹⁵⁵ Burma was a crucial rice supplier to Bengal; Cochin (1.5 million people)

¹⁵¹ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

¹⁵² Alex de Waal, 2018, accessed December 8, 2018, <https://fletcher.tufts.edu/World-Peace-Foundation/Program/Research/Mass-Atrocities-Research-Program/Mass-Famine>.

¹⁵³ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

¹⁵⁴ Lance Brennan, Les Heathcote and Anton Lucas, "War And Famine Around The Indian Ocean During The Second World War", *Research In Ethical Issues In Organizations*, 2017, 5-70, doi:10.1108/s1529-209620170000018002.

¹⁵⁵ Arthur Herman, *Gandhi & Churchill* (New York: Bantam Books, 2009), 51-52.

imported 60% of its rice directly from Burma.¹⁵⁶ Consequentially, Burma's loss played a critical role in the shortfall of food production. Overall, Churchill's ability to generate alternatives to solve the Famine, was substantially affected by the Japanese Burmese acquisition and war demands on transportation. Therefore, Churchill's rational choice calculations were restricted, preventing him from making routine alleviation decisions due to war pressures. Hence, Churchill's actions were not dark in this situation.

Churchill's scorched earth and denial policies, due to a fear of Japanese invasion, were dark and irrational to a great extent. This entailed police destroying rice stock and boats (the lifeline of the region).¹⁵⁷ Accordingly, the boat denial policy prevented fisherman's rights to fish, thus livelihoods were lost causing an economic decline.¹⁵⁸ This was a policy programmed to harm Japanese, if they invaded, though it solely impacted on Bengalis. Nonetheless, Churchill should have made more reflective decisions, which considered food availability and livelihoods of Bengalis, before making such crucial decisions, when choosing the best alternative to solve the problem in the rational choice process. However, these tactics were considered rudimentary during wartime. Russians, for example, insisted upon a scorch earth

¹⁵⁶ Mark Tauger, "The Indian Famine Crises Of World War II", *British Scholar* 1, no. 2 (2009): 188.

¹⁵⁷ Soutik Biswas, "How Churchill 'Starved' India", *BBC News*, 2010, accessed April 3, 2019. http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/soutikbiswas/2010/10/how_churchill_starved_india.html.

¹⁵⁸ "Churchill's Policies Led To Bengal Famine", *News 18*, 2010, accessed December 8, 2019. <https://www.news18.com/news/books/churchills-policies-led-to-bengal-famine-355211.html>.

policy after Germans attacked (1941).¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, Gilbert argues Churchill did the best he could in the midst of World War and goes to the extent of claiming, without Churchill, the Famine would have been far worse.¹⁶⁰ Although scorch earth and boat denial policies were rudimentary at the time, Churchill should have considered their impact, proving his actions were not logically ordered, thus irrational. These policies showed Churchill's dark side to a large extent, because he took mischievousness and dutifulness to an extreme.¹⁶¹

Churchill's economic motivation is a rational preference, but prioritising finance over lives shows a dark side. Davis links capitalism and colonialism together for causing famines, since capitalism procreates a self-interested greedy nature, meaning colonies become of secondary importance.¹⁶² Also, this increased Churchill's economic preferences, as Amery suggested, investing millions in India by transporting and providing food would be unjustifiable for a country who is losing millions of pounds a day in debt.¹⁶³ This, in combination with investment in a colony soon to be independent, was regarded as unjustifiable. Thus, the costs would be too high with

¹⁵⁹ von Gerhard Brennecke, *Die Nürnberger Geschichtsentstellung* (Verl. der Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung: Auflage, 1970), 303-322.

¹⁶⁰ Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: The Churchill Documents* (Hillsdale, Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 2006), 51.

¹⁶¹ Robert Hogan, "Reflection On The Dark Side", *Hogan Assessments*, 2014, accessed April 22, 2019. http://info.hoganassessments.com/hubfs/Reflections_Dark_Side_R1.pdf?t=1449605677671.

¹⁶² Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2000), 277-279.

¹⁶³ Leo. S Amery, John Barnes and David Nicholson, *The Leo Amery Diaries* (London: Hutchinson, 1980).

minimal value return to Britain (rational). However, prioritising self-interested economics over lives, conforms to sadistic, narcissistic and psychopathic dark personality elements¹⁶⁴. Although, this is not a defect in Churchill, but capitalism.

Contrarily, the economic crisis played a crucial role in the Famine and proved Churchill did not occupy sole responsibility. Globally, there was an increase demand for supply of food, because of increased military expenditure on industrialisation, generating an economic boom¹⁶⁵. Therefore, Bengalis moved from rural to urban areas for work. Consequentially, as demand for food was consistent, whilst supply decreased, there was a supply deficit. This caused price increases, which only the affluent could absorb (failure of exchange entitlement theory¹⁶⁶), inevitably enabling the black market to prosper¹⁶⁷. Sen concluded the Famine resulted from a wartime economic boom, which raised prices faster than wages¹⁶⁸. Moreover, the universal distribution system became increasingly established, which provoked an inability for less economically developed countries, such as India, to afford. Overall, Das labelled the Famine as the

¹⁶⁴ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

¹⁶⁵ Mark Tauger, "The Indian Famine Crises Of World War II", *British Scholar* 1, no. 2 (2009): 178.

¹⁶⁶ Amartya Sen, "Starvation And Exchange Entitlements: A General Approach And Its Application To The Great Bengal Famine", *Cambridge Journal Of Economics* 1, no. 1 (1976): 33-59, doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035349.

¹⁶⁷ Mark Tauger, "The Indian Famine Crises Of World War II", *British Scholar* 1, no. 2 (2009): 189.

¹⁶⁸ Amartya Sen, *Poverty And Famines: An Essay On Entitlement And Deprivation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 52-83.

worst economic disaster of the twentieth century.¹⁶⁹ External factors, outside of Churchill's rational choice decision making, included the wartime economic boom and universal distribution system. These played a significant role in the Famine.

Churchill's agency cannot be entirely consigned to the Famine, due to the population boom's pivotal role. The fact India grew from 251,167 million (1911) to 317,042 million (1941) people.¹⁷⁰ led to an increase demand for food, which agricultural production could not sufficiently provide.¹⁷¹ For clarification, Bengal was an Indian province before the independence partition (1947). Additionally, McAlpin asserts population growth was instigated by rising life expectancies.¹⁷² Conversely, widespread increased economic, productivity, efficiency and steady improvement in aspirations ¹⁷³ decreased mortality rates. However, Mitra adds increased food variety, resulting in improved balanced diets, equated to decreased mortality.¹⁷⁴ In synopsis, the increase life expectancy initiated increased food demand, outweighing supply, resulting in a Famine. Thus, Churchill did not influence this outcome; therefore, he is not the basic unit of analysis.

¹⁶⁹ Debarshi Das, "A Relook At The Bengal Famine", *Economic And Political Weekly* 43, no. 31 (2008): 59.

¹⁷⁰ Michelle B. McAlpin, "Famines, Epidemics, And Population Growth: The Case Of India", *Journal Of Interdisciplinary History* 14, no. 2 (1983): 351, doi:10.2307/203709.

¹⁷¹ "Bengal Famine Of 1943", *Global Security*, accessed April 10, 2019. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/famine-bengal-1943.htm>.

¹⁷² Michelle B. McAlpin, "Famines, Epidemics, And Population Growth: The Case Of India", *Journal Of Interdisciplinary History* 14, no. 2 (1983): 351, doi:10.2307/203709.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Asok Mitra, *India's Population* (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1978), 37.

The Brown Spot disease, a natural disaster, contributed towards the Famine's severity to a moderate extent. Rice constituted 92% of Bangladeshi food production and 72% of cropped land for rice production;¹⁷⁵ in turn rice was (and is) their staple. Therefore, when rice production is affected, there are drastic consequences. Particularly, during the Brown Spot disease (also named *Helminthosporium Oryzae*), which affected rice grain yield from 40-90% in places¹⁷⁶ and was 'exceptionally virulent'¹⁷⁷, as it is applicable to all rice varieties¹⁷⁸. Additionally, the disease commenced in 1942¹⁷⁹ and its extent was not realised until 1943's harvest¹⁸⁰; therefore, combative preparations were non-existent. Also, the long-term impact was the disease could survive in the seed for up to 4 years¹⁸¹ in which this rice was inedible, even for cattle feed, meaning

¹⁷⁵ R Rashed et al., "Effect Of Brown Spot On The Yield And Yield Contributing Characters Of Different Hybrid Varieties/Lines Of Boro Rice", *Plant Pathology Journal* 1, no. 2 (2002): 58-60, doi:10.3923/ppj.2002.58.60.

¹⁷⁶ R Webster and P Gunnell, *Compendium of Rice Diseases* (Minnesota: APS Press, 1992), 62.

¹⁷⁷ Lance Brennan, Les Heathcote and Anton Lucas, "War And Famine Around The Indian Ocean During The Second World War", *Research In Ethical Issues In Organizations*, no. 18 2017, 5-70, doi:10.1108/s1529-209620170000018002.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ M. K. Barnwal et al., "A Review On Crop Losses, Epidemiology And Disease Management Of Rice Brown Spot To Identify Research Priorities And Knowledge Gaps", *European Journal Of Plant Pathology* 136, no. 3 (2013): 443-457, doi:10.1007/s10658-013-0195-6.

¹⁸⁰ Gianessi Leonard and Ashley Williams, "Repeat Of Great Bengal Famine Unlikely", *International Pesticide Benefits Case Study*, no. 74 (2012), accessed April 4, 2019. https://croplife.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf_files/Repeat-of-Great-Bengal-Famine-Unlikely-Thanks-to-Fungicides.pdf.

¹⁸¹ "Guyana Rice Development: Board Management Of Brown Spot Disease", *Burma Rice Research Station*, accessed April 14, 2019, <http://grdb.gy/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Brown-Spot-of-Rice.pdf>.

whole crops were lost. Correspondingly, impacting upon an already fragile economy and rice scarcity led to significant price increases. For instance, the official rice price per mound rose from 12 Rupees in February 1943 to 32 Rupees by July.¹⁸² Furthermore, Sen purports this led to a failure in exchange entitlement (too high food prices), comparatively to their assets and earnings. Subsequently, Bengalis could not afford food, triggering starvation.¹⁸³ Additionally, Padmanabhan claims 'nothing as devastating as the Bengal epiphytotic of 1942 has been recorded in plant pathological literature'¹⁸⁴, concluding the disease was the Famine's principal cause. Whereas Sen proposes the harvest only decreased by five percent; hence not adequate to instigate a Famine.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, Sen argues rice availability was lower in 1941 compared to 1943, which in 1941 did not instigate a loss in lives.¹⁸⁶ Arguably, ulterior man-made factors were responsible. Contrarily, Brennan poses the disease was inevitable, henceforth man-made interventional, prevention measures would have minimal affects.¹⁸⁷ However, measures would have had an impact, such as replacing diseased rice with non-diseased rice or ulterior crops. Summarising, the Brown Spot disease

¹⁸² Lance Brennan, Les Heathcote and Anton Lucas, "War And Famine Around The Indian Ocean During The Second World War", *Research In Ethical Issues In Organizations*, no. 18 2017, 5-70, doi:10.1108/s1529-209620170000018002.

¹⁸³ Mark Tauger, "The Indian Famine Crises Of World War II", *British Scholar* 1, no. 2 (2009): 166-196.

¹⁸⁴ S. Padmanabhan, "The Great Bengal Famine," *Annual Review of Phytopathology* 11 (1973), 11-24.

¹⁸⁵ Amartya Sen, *Poverty And Famines*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: OUP, 1984), 58.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Lance Brennan, Les Heathcote and Anton Lucas, "War And Famine Around The Indian Ocean During The Second World War", *Research In Ethical Issues In Organizations*, no. 18 2017, 5-70, doi:10.1108/s1529-209620170000018002.

played a role in decreasing rice production and availability, but as there were not a drastic change, paralleled to when the harvest was worse in 1941, natural factors were unaccountable.

Another natural occurrence is the Midnapur Cyclone (1942), which played a role in the Bengal Famine to a moderate extent. Brennan suggests the Cyclone destroyed rice crops, reserves¹⁸⁸ and spread the Brown Spot disease¹⁸⁹, which increased its capability efficacy; therefore, disrupting usual food provisions. Furthermore, Braund's 1944 report, stated the Cyclone and disease led to a two-million-tonne rice deficit¹⁹⁰, as 1.5 million tonnes¹⁹¹ were decimated by the Cyclone. Ordinarily, Bengal only produced 10-15 million tonnes¹⁹², (accounting for the lowest and highest estimates)¹⁹³. This demonstrates the Midnapur Cyclone played a larger role than the Brown Spot disease and around 10% of the rice crop was lost. However, Sen still asserts this was not enough to cause a Famine¹⁹⁴. Nevertheless, Blyn calculates the

¹⁸⁸ O, Goswami. The Bengal Famine of 1943. *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 27, no.4, 1990, 465–474.

¹⁸⁹ Sankalan Baidya, "1943 Bengal Famine Facts: 45 Facts On Churchill's Engineered Genocide", *Facts Legend*, 2018, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://factslegend.org/1943-bengal-famine-facts-45-facts-on-churchills-engineered-genocide/>.

¹⁹⁰ H Braund, *Famine in Bengal*, typescript July 1944, Braund Archives, 09WO, 715, Eur 792/2, India Office Library, London, 1944 (Courtesy of Dr Peter Bowbrick)

¹⁹¹ Henry Knight, *Food Administration in India, 1939-47* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1954), 126.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Amartya Sen, *Poverty And Famines*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: OUP, 1984), 58.

Cyclone, and subsequent floods, reduced the Bengal rice harvest by a third; twice the decline Sen accounted for.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, this had a critical impact, in addition to the Cyclone's short-term consequences of 11,000 deaths and damaged infrastructure (527,000 homes were lost¹⁹⁶). In the long run, water borne diseases were allowed to thrive, such as Cholera,¹⁹⁷ and this signaled the turning point for rice price inflation.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, the Cyclone became a distraction for the Bengal government, particularly the Revenue Department, whose focus was on cyclone relief rather than the food crisis. The Department also struggled with geographical difficulties¹⁹⁹, caused by the Cyclone,²⁰⁰ leading to a wider and more severe food crisis. Overall, the Cyclone played a critical role in spreading the Brown Spot disease, destroying food necessities and causing rice inflation, however, it did not play as pivotal role as Churchill's actions.

Aside from Churchill's impact in the Bengal Famine, another factor, namely Indian officials' mis-governance and corruption, had a significant role. Local officials were distracted by the Quit India Movement. This activated a neglect of their core focus; the Famine²⁰¹. Additionally, local officials did not follow the 1941 Famine Protocol

¹⁹⁵ George Blyn, *Agricultural Trends In India, 1891-1947: Output, Availability, And Productivity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 253-254.

¹⁹⁶ Janam Mukherjee, *Hungry Bengal: War, Famine And The End Of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 111-112.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ *Report On Bengal* (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1945), 33.

¹⁹⁹ William A Dando, *Food And Famine In The 21St Century* (California: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 145.

²⁰⁰ Ross Talbot, "Towards A Newer World: By B.R. Sen", *Food Policy* 8, no. 2 (1982): 161-162.

Manual, which set out clear guidance of when and how to act to relive a famine²⁰². However, this manual was only a draft; therefore, considered insufficient for full compliance²⁰³. Arguably, however, it contained the most useful advice²⁰⁴. Neogy (Indian politician) attempted to access the Manual during the Famine's height, but was denied by the Revenue Minister, whom claimed it was superseded since the advent of 'provincial autonomy'²⁰⁵. Additionally, officials were extremely corrupt. Langworth states the Government of India were unduly tender with speculators and hoarders²⁰⁶. Subsequently, many people financially benefited from the Famine, highlighted in the Famine Inquiry Commission, which calculated a thousand rupees (equivalent to £3,807 in 2018²⁰⁷) of profits were accrued per death²⁰⁸. Furthermore, half of relief goods appeared on the black market or acquired by official's relatives and friends²⁰⁹.

²⁰¹ Arthur Herman, "Absent Churchill, Bengal's Famine Would Have Been Worse", *Hillsdale College*, 2017, accessed April 21, 2019, <https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/churcills-secret-war-bengal-famine-1943/>.

²⁰² "Bengal. Revenue Department, Bengal Famine Code. Revised Edition Of 1905. Calcutta, 1905" (Calcutta, 1905), British Library: Asian and African Studies, 5.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Lance Brennan, "Government Famine Relief In Bengal, 1943", *The Journal Of Asian Studies* 47, no. 3 (1988): 541, doi:10.2307/2056974.

²⁰⁵ K C Neogy, "Testimony of K.C. Neogy", Nanavati Papers, 1287.

²⁰⁶ Richard M Langworth, *Winston Churchill, Myth And Reality - What He Actually Did And Said* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2017). 28

²⁰⁷ Gregory Clark. "The Annual RPI and Average Earnings for Britain, 1209 to Present". *Measuring Worth*, 2017. accessed January 27, 2019. <https://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/ukearnncpi/>

²⁰⁸ Famine Inquiry Commission, *Report on Bengal* (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, Government of India Press, 1945), 79.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 75.

Also, in January 1943, due to fear of Japanese invasion, a permit was required for grain transportation, which allowed a state rice monopoly, prompting corruption and bribes, especially concerning shipping permits²¹⁰. In addition, a Famine code was never officially declared, because this would require utilisation of reserves that had already been emptied by officials. These were specifically designated for famines²¹¹. Moreover, local government officials feared their own provinces risk of famine, meaning they restricted rice support²¹². Hence, Wavell had to threaten legal and military action to enable substantial amounts of grain to become available²¹³. Although, other actors such as Muslim and Hindu ministries and communities contributed minimally towards famine relief²¹⁴. Consequentially, Churchill arguably did not have power to implement his rational choice preferences, because of Indian official's insubordination. Therefore, the dark triad of narcissism and Machiavellianism²¹⁵ was utilised by Indian official's, rather than Churchill, whose revisionist literature has attributed solely culpability to him.

²¹⁰ Tyler Cowen, "The Causes Of The Bengal Famine", *Marginal Revolution*, 2015, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/02/the-causes-of-the-bengal-famine.html>.

²¹¹ Famine Inquiry Commission, *Report on Bengal* (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, Government of India Press, 1945), 79.

²¹² Cormac Ó Gráda, *Eating People Is Wrong, And Other Essays On Famine, Its Past, And Its Future* (New Jersey: Princeton University, 2015), 31-90.

²¹³ James Holland, *Burma '44* (London: Bantam Press, 2016), 141-173.

²¹⁴ Joanna Simonow, *Understanding Humanitarian Action In South Asia* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2015), 2-5.

²¹⁵ John Vaughan, "Everybody's Got A Dark Side", *Medium*, 2016, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://medium.com/@blueshirtjohn/everybodys-got-a-dark-side-a8312604a645>.

In conclusion, Churchill predominantly acted rationally during the Bengal Famine, however a dark side was evident to a great extent. Churchill's ship diversion policies were rational, whilst showing a moderate dark side. However, the role of Churchill's irrational imperialist logic, albeit rational racist attitudes, irrational scorch earth and denial policies, undoubtedly portrayed a dark side to a large extent. Moreover, there were ulterior factors out of Churchill's control, such as World War Two, population and economic booms, Brown Spot disease, Midnapur cyclone and Indian official corruption as well as mis-governance, affecting his decision-making. Nevertheless, these were less significant than Churchill's role. Therefore, as Polya states, "Churchill is our hero because of his leadership in World War 2, but his immense crimes, notably the ... 1943-1945 Bengal Famine ... have been deleted from history"²¹⁶. This allows us to conclude Churchill's received positive, historical perception has suppressed the recollection of the Bengal Famine, because of the potential negative impact on Churchill's image; thus, concealing the presence of a dark side.

²¹⁶ Gideon Polya, "Media Lying Over Churchill's Crimes", *MWC News*, 2008, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://sites.google.com/site/afghanistangenocideessays/media-lying-over-churchill-s-crimes>.

Chapter 2: Percentage Agreement

The Percentage Agreement, between Churchill and Stalin (October 9th, 1944) is arguably one of the most crucial deals in diplomatic history. Naimark explains the deal confirmed that Eastern Europe, initially at least, would lie within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.²¹⁷ Hence, he purports it had equal importance to Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (August 1945) Agreements.²¹⁸ The Percentage Agreement is less notorious, particularly in Western sanitised spheres and Carlton asserts it was not Great Britain's finest hour.²¹⁹ Becker, however, argues this was Britain's last-ditch attempt to save Eastern Europe from communism by attempting to secure some influence for the Western powers.²²⁰ This chapter's line of analysis will be modified from that of the Bengal Famine, since Churchill conclusively possessed complete agency during the Percentage Agreement. Thus, the Percentage Agreement will be outlined, before examining its legitimacy by considering the role of Greece, British decline and the threat of communism. This will be followed by an evaluation of Churchill's method, including American exclusionism and the Agreement's importance; all with the application of rational and irrational choice theory and dark

²¹⁷ Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History Of The Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 175.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 115-117.

²²⁰ Andras Becker, "When Stalin And Churchill Divided Europe: Revisiting The "Percentage Agreement" October, 1944", *Steemit*, 2018, accessed April 14, 2019. https://steemit.com/history/@andra_s.becker/when-stalin-and-churchill-divided-europe-the-percentage-agreement-1944.

side frameworks. Finally, this chapter will argue Churchill's actions in the Percentage Agreement were irrational and showed his dark side to a large extent.

To abundantly assess the extent of Churchill's dark side, a description of the Agreement is necessary. Churchill's and Stalin's secret informal Percentage Agreement²²¹ was made during the 4th Moscow conference. Essentially, the British preserved Greek independence, whilst Soviets maintained prominence in Romania and Bulgaria²²². However, the controversy is concerning the method by which the Agreement was formed²²³. Churchill wrote on a piece of paper a list of Eastern and Southern European countries. He then divided the countries, attaching percentages to each of them. After which the sheet was passed to Stalin, who marked it with a large blue tick, before returning it to Churchill²²⁴. Churchill recalled saying, "might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper"²²⁵. Stalin replied, "No, you keep it"²²⁶. This implied Stalin wanted Churchill to remember his

²²¹ Albert Resis, "The Churchill-Stalin Secret "Percentages" Agreement On The Balkans, Moscow, October 1944", *The American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (1978): 368, doi:10.2307/1862322.

²²² John W Young, "Churchill And The East-West Detente", *Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society* 11 (2001): 373-392, doi:10.1017/s0080440101000196.

²²³ Eric Roman, *Hungary And The Victor Powers, 1945-1950* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 26.

²²⁴ Louis P Cassimatis, *American Influence In Greece 1917-1929* (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988), 240.

²²⁵ "9 October 1944: Churchill And Stalin Meet At The Kremlin", *World War Two Today*, accessed April 5, 2019, <http://ww2today.com/9-october-1944-churchill-and-stalin-meet-at-the-kremlin>.

²²⁶ Ibid

imperialist dictatorial methods. Specifically, the countries and percentages were: Romania- 90% Russian 10% others; Greece- 90% British (in accord with U.S.A) and 10% Russia; Yugoslavia 50-50%; Hungary 50-50% and Bulgaria- 75% Russia and 25% the others.²²⁷ These percentages resembled spheres of influences, therefore deciphering who had predominance.²²⁸ Though it should be remembered, Poland was deliberately left out, because of its debatable, contested, personal and problematic nature.²²⁹ Surprisingly, the Americans were excluded, despite Harriman acting as a representative for Roosevelt at the conference²³⁰. Overall, the fact Churchill proposed, via his handwritten sheet, and Stalin agreed to divide Southern and Eastern Europe, simply with a tick, clearly showed an ingrained dark side, worthy of analysis.

Remarkably, the Percentage Agreement was revealed by Churchill himself in his memoir, *Triumph and Tragedy*²³¹(1953). Permission was granted by Prime Minister Attlee to access all the relevant documents when writing the memoir.²³² Although, Neilson argues Churchill's memoirs were designed to show him in a favourable

²²⁷ "Percentage Deal", *The Global Cold War*, accessed April 5, 2019, <http://cassidygllobalcoldwar.weebly.com/percentage-deal.html>.

²²⁸ Leslie Holmes, *Communism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25.

²²⁹ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War To Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 226.

²³⁰ Leslie Holmes, *Communism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25.

²³¹ Winston Churchill, *Second World War: Volume VI Triumph And Tragedy* (London: Cassell & Company, 1953).

²³² Valentin Naumescu, *Democracy And Security In The 21St Century* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 23.

light²³³, through exaggeration, poetic license or minor inaccuracies²³⁴. Consequentially, the credibility of his recollections is questionable. Nonetheless, Russia was embarrassed, so originally denied all knowledge whilst suggesting the Agreement was 'dirty and crude'²³⁵. Later, however, the Russians conceded to the validity of the document; though purported exclusive responsibility onto Churchill²³⁶. Additionally, as Stalin had just died, Churchill recognised he could not contradict his recount²³⁷; hence a prime motivation for the timing of the memoir's release. Furthermore, he was currently Prime Minister for a second term in 1953, so his abilities and capability would have been increasingly discredited by the release of the Agreement. Although he was aware this would be his last term, due to declining health²³⁸. Nevertheless, he desired to preserve his legacy. Consequently, he would have wanted to release the document in accordance with his own interpretation. Conversely, at the time, financial motives were evident. Even in the 1930s and 1940s

²³³ Francis Neilson, "Winston Churchill's War Memoirs", *American Journal Of Economics And Sociology* 8, no. 2 (1949): 193-208, doi:10.1111/j.1536-7150.1949.tb00758.x.

²³⁴ "The Second World War (6 Volumes)", *Churchill Book Collector*, accessed April 5, 2019, <https://www.churchillbookcollector.com/pages/winston-churchill/239/the-second-world-war-6-volumes>.

²³⁵ "Percentage Deal", *The Global Cold War*, accessed April 5, 2019, <http://cassidyglobalcoldwar.weebly.com/percentage-deal.html>.

²³⁶ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War To Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 461.

²³⁷ Valentin Naumescu, *Democracy And Security In The 21st Century* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 23.

²³⁸ John W Scadding and J Allister Vale, "Sir Winston Churchill: Recovery From An Acute Stroke In June 1953 And Triumph At The Conservative Party Conference In October 1953", *Journal Of The Royal Society Of Medicine* 112, no. 2 (2018): 61-71, doi:10.1177/0141076818808425.

Churchill was bankrupt and relying on loans²³⁹. Accordingly, he was obliged to sell copies of his memoirs, by producing intriguing material, particularly as his publishing deal was equivalent to £27.5 million today²⁴⁰. Overall, Churchill produced the received orthodox view of the Percentage Agreement, before historical revisionists could discredit him, to attempt to preserve his euphoric heroic legacy.

Securing the maintenance of Greece's geo-strategic positioning for the British Empire, through the Percentage Agreement, showed Churchill's rationality and dark side to a small extent. Greece secured British naval dominance in the Mediterranean²⁴¹. Nonetheless, this was not easily conceded by the Russians, evidently during the Turkey Strait Crisis (1946), where Russia attempted to force Turkey into giving the Russian navy access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Consequentially, the West reacted with the Truman Doctrine (1947) and Turkey joined NATO (1948) to protect Turkey from Russian threats²⁴². Moreover, this extreme reaction was because Britain was desperate to preserve naval dominance and balance of power in the Mediterranean²⁴³. Churchill was acting as a rational agent. He selected to secure

²³⁹ David Lough, "Churchill Couldn't Handle His Money", *The Atlantic*, 2016, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/01/why-winston-churchill-was-so-bad-with-money/419094/>.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Andrew Mollo, Malcolm McGregor and Pierre Turner, *The Armed Forces Of World War II* (New York: Military Press, 1987), 128.

²⁴² Murat Piçak, "Political, Economic And Strategic Dimension Of The Turkish-Soviet Strait Question Emerged After World War II", *International Journal Of Business And Social Science* 2, no. 15 (2011): 173-180.

²⁴³ Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith, "Athens 1944: Britain's Dirty Secret", *The Guardian*, 2014, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-1944-britains-dirty-secret>.

Greece from all possible alternatives to maximise British utility (Mediterranean naval dominance). However, this was arguably a narcissistic action to a small extent, because British interests were prioritised²⁴⁴.

Moreover, Greece protected the Suez Canal; the 'spinal cord of the British Empire'²⁴⁵. This was crucial for British economic imperialism²⁴⁶. In 1869, the canal was constructed and, by 1875, Britain purchased 44% of the shares, whilst contributing 80%²⁴⁷ of the 120-mile-long Suez Canal's²⁴⁸ traffic. Thus, connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea, meaning ships did not have to bypass around the Cape Colony to Asia (cutting the journey by 2000 miles²⁴⁹), subsequently causing Egypt to become an indispensable link in global trade²⁵⁰. Furthermore, the canal guarded and increased connectedness with Asian colonies, such as the 'Jewel in the Crown'²⁵¹,

²⁴⁴ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

²⁴⁵ J. D Omer-Cooper, *The Making Of Modern Africa* (Essex: Longman, 1986), 45.

²⁴⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power And Peace* (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1993), 71.

²⁴⁷ Tiyambe Zeleza, "An Economic History Of The Middle East And North Africa", *A Modern Economic History Of Africa* 1 (1993): 349.

²⁴⁸ William Fisher and Charles Smith, "Suez Canal", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2019, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal>.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Olukoya Ogen, "The Economic Lifeline Of British Global Empire: A Reconsideration Of The Historical Dynamics Of The Suez Canal, 1869-1956", *The Journal Of International Social Research* 1, no. 5 (2008): 524.

²⁵¹ Paul Scott, *The Jewel In The Crown* (London: Arrow, 2005), 292.

India. Therefore, Britain was rational in protecting the canal at all costs, shown by Britain's largest garrison (80,000 soldiers)²⁵² being situated on the canal. Also, Britain was willing to jeopardise Anglo-American relations at the canal's expense in the Suez Crisis (1956), showing its importance. However, in turn, Peden contends this signified the end of Great Britain's role as one of the world major powers²⁵³. Overall, Churchill acted rationally in the Percentage Agreement, because he maintained British trade and imperialist interests. Although, desire for power and commerce, have been linked to a dark side²⁵⁴, Churchill's actions were dark to a small extent.

Greece was vitally important ideologically, due to the Greek civil war's emergence; thus, Churchill acted rationally here, with minimal dark connotations. The Percentage Agreement was formed three days before the Germans left Athens²⁵⁵. Hence, Carlton argues an informal deal had been done on the point that mattered most to Churchill and he had Stalin's consent to handle Greece 'as he saw fit'²⁵⁶. This implied Churchill could militarily crush Greek communist forces with Stalin's permission²⁵⁷. Therefore,

²⁵² Robert Bothwell, *Alliance And Illusion* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 124.

²⁵³ G. C. Peden, "Suez And Britain's Decline As A World Power", *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 04 (2012): 1073-1096, doi:10.1017/s0018246x12000246.

²⁵⁴ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

²⁵⁵ Lars Baerentzen, "The German Withdrawal From Greece In 1944 And British Naval "Inactivity"", *Journal Of Modern Greek Studies* 5, no. 2 (1987): 237-265, doi:10.1353/mgs.2010.0216.

²⁵⁶ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 116.

²⁵⁷ Richard Pallardy, "Greek Civil War", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2009, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Greek-Civil-War>.

Carlton contends the Agreement opened the way for Greece to be saved from communism.²⁵⁸ Additionally, Eudes suggests Stalin deceived Greek communists²⁵⁹ for Eastern Europe, while Percival similarly argues Churchill divulged Romanian and Bulgarian²⁶⁰ democracy in exchange for Greece.²⁶¹ Thus, to prevent the other acting out of bad faith after reaching an understanding²⁶², both states legitimately conceded. This shows Churchill and Stalin were acting and treating each other as rational problem-solving agents. They were attempting to maximise each other objectives by considering each other's strategies and preferences, since one side did not want to surrender to the other, rather cooperate for mutual benefit²⁶³; namely, employing game theory, a fundamental element of rational choice²⁶⁴. Nash's equilibrium was reached²⁶⁵, because Stalin and Churchill optimised their outcomes, based on the other person's expectations; thus, satisfying both parties. Overall, ideological

²⁵⁸ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 200.

²⁵⁹ Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanios* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

²⁶⁰ Max Kuhelj Bugaric, "Birth of The Cold War", *UCLA Historical Journal* 25, no. 1 (2014): 46.

²⁶¹ Mark Percival, "Churchill And Romania: The Myth Of The October 1944 'Betrayal'", *Contemporary British History* 12, no. 3 (1998): 41-61, doi:10.1080/13619469808581488.

²⁶² Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanios* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

²⁶³ Gary Goodpaster, "Rational Decision-Making In Problem-Solving Negotiation: Compromise, Interest-Valuation, And Cognitive Error", *Ohio State Journal On Dispute Resolution* 8, no. 2 (1993): 299-305.

²⁶⁴ S.M. Amadae, "Rational Choice Theory", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2016, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/rational-choice-theory>.

²⁶⁵ Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, *A Course In Game Theory* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2016), 14.

motivations emphasise a dark side to a small extent, despite Machiavellian undertones of moral disregard²⁶⁶.

Churchill's use of the Percentage Agreement, for British imperial decline limitation, was irrational and dark to a large extent. Sfikas states Churchill was a 'fervent custodian of Britain's imperial grandeur'²⁶⁷ and 'a full-blooded imperialist'²⁶⁸. He was cultivated in the Victorian era; thus, this attitude was prevalent²⁶⁹. Additionally, Churchill was the leader of the declining view²⁷⁰ of British racial imperial superiority. Conceptually, championing imperialism argues for British races altruistic undertaking²⁷¹; the 'white man's burden'²⁷² to colonise. This is evident in Churchill's Greek expansionism. Here, he utilised arms, because he considered Reade's claim of war being an 'essential agent of change'²⁷³. This a rational decision, because

²⁶⁶ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

²⁶⁷ Thanasis D. Sfikas, "The People At The Top Can Do These Things, Which Others Can't Do': Winston Churchill and The Greeks", *Journal Of Contemporary History* 20 (1991): 308-312.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Winston Churchill, *My Early Life* (London: Eland Publishing Limited, 2000), 9.

²⁷⁰ Thanasis D. Sfikas, "The People At The Top Can Do These Things, Which Others Can't Do': Winston Churchill and The Greeks", *Journal Of Contemporary History* 20 (1991): 308-312.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 310.

²⁷² William Fisher and Gordon Smith, "Suez Canal", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2018, accessed April 14, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal>.

²⁷³ Paul Addison, "The Political Beliefs Of Winston Churchill", *Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society* 30 (1980): 23-47, doi:10.2307/3679001.

Churchill is a methodological, individualistic, self-utility maximiser²⁷⁴. However, irrational, because imperial objectives were inconsistently applied, especially with Churchill's freedom rhetoric, used to rally colonists against the Nazis²⁷⁵. Additionally, at the time, it was clear the British Empire was in severe decline²⁷⁶. In 1942, 21% of the world was British, comparatively to 7% by 1949²⁷⁷. Moreover, bipolar balance of power was developing (America and Russia)²⁷⁸. Thus, for Churchill to resist this inevitability, he utilised the Percentage Agreement as a desperate attempt to stabilise the British decline and evade the reality of growing Soviet Balkan power and American influence. Summarising, Churchill was warmongering and power hungry; traditional views²⁷⁹, all representative of a dark side to a great extent. Though his imperialistic motives are inconsistently applied, hence irrational.

²⁷⁴ Andrew H Kydd, "Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice", *Oxford Handbooks*, 2008, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0025.

²⁷⁵ Winston Churchill, "The Defense Of Freedom And Peace (The Lights Are Going Out)", *The International Churchill Society*, 1938, accessed April 19, 2019. <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1930-1938-the-wilderness/the-defence-of-freedom-and-peace/>.

²⁷⁶ "Churchill Returns To Moscow", *WW2 History*, accessed April 6, 2019. http://ww2history.com/key_moments/Eastern/Churchill_returns_to_Moscow.

²⁷⁷ Matthew Boesler, "Chart: Here Was The Size Of The British Empire As A Percentage Of Total World Land Mass", *Business Insider*, 2013, accessed April 15, 2019. <http://www.businessinsider.com/charting-the-decline-of-the-british-empire-2013-12?IR=T>.

²⁷⁸ Yui Hatcho, "The Atlantic Charter Of 1941: A Political Tool Of Non-Belligerent America", *The Japanese Journal Of American Studies* 14 (2003): 132.

²⁷⁹ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

The Percentage Agreement was a tool utilised by Churchill to constrain an increasing threat of communism, consequently rational and showing a dark side to a small extent. Despite Lord Moran arguing Anglo-Soviet relations were the highest during this point²⁸⁰, Churchill's intense opposition to communism prevailed. Wood insinuates Churchill had an anti-Soviet and communist obsession²⁸¹, evident in Churchill's reference to 'troops of ferocious baboons'²⁸² and a 'culture of typhoid'²⁸³. Churchill supported the White Movement (anti-communists) in the 1917-1923 Civil War²⁸⁴ and Operation Unthinkable (1945). Yet, Yergin argued Churchill had ambivalent feelings concerning communism during the war²⁸⁵. On one hand, Churchill was an anti-communist and radical left wing, though a practical war leader, believing the defeat of far-right Nazism and Fascism. This demonstrates, Churchill was a rational agent in prioritising his preference of communism over fascism. Moreover, Bugaric notes Churchill's European objective was a 'rapid advancement'²⁸⁶ with the hope of liberating or controlling at least some of the countries that Stalin wanted to control²⁸⁷.

²⁸⁰ Charles Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle For Survival, 1940-1965* (London: Heron Books, 1966).

²⁸¹ Ian S Wood, *Churchill* (Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000), 5-65.

²⁸² Walter L. Arnstein and Martin Gilbert, "Winston S. Churchill. Vol. IV: The Stricken World, 1916-1922.", *Political Science Quarterly* 91, no. 3 (1976): 227-257, doi:10.2307/2148968.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Damien Wright, *Churchill's Secret War With Lenin* (Solihull: Helion and Company, 2017), 1.

²⁸⁵ Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 178.

²⁸⁶ Max Kuhelj Bugaric, "Birth Of The Cold War", *UCLA Historical Journal* 25, no. 1 (2014), 44.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

Although, in mid-1944, Churchill acknowledged Anglo-Americans were not capable of achieving this. Thus, Bugarcic contends the optimal solution for Churchill was a division of the world into spheres of influence²⁸⁸, via the Percentage Agreement. Therefore, the Agreement was the most applicable rational method to maximise utility. However, this was difficult, as the Red Army occupied the majority of Eastern Europe and suffered heavily during the war (26 million deaths)²⁸⁹. Additionally, Churchill was so fearful of communism, he arranged the Moscow Conference before the next 'Big Three'²⁹⁰ were meant to convene²⁹¹. This is because he was fearful of the Red Army implementing communism, particularly, in Greece, where Stalin was expected to subsidise communist troops²⁹². This suggests Churchill was rational in attempting to constrain the costs of a future communist threat. Overall, Churchill's ingrained fear of communism and the Soviet Union, necessitated him initiating the Percentage Agreement, as an attempt to curtail this fear. Therefore, the Percentage Agreement

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ishaan Tharoor, "Don't Forget How The Soviet Union Saved The World From Hitler", 2015, accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world-views/wp/2015/05/08/dont-forget-how-the-soviet-union-saved-the-world-from-hitler/?utm_term=.37452fa2b2c4.

²⁹⁰ Jones Maldwyn, *The Limits Of Liberty: American History 1607-1980* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1983), 505.

²⁹¹ Max Kuhelj Bugarcic, "Birth Of The Cold War", *UCLA Historical Journal* 25, no. 1 (2014), 44.

²⁹² Amikam Nachmani, "Civil War And Foreign Intervention In Greece: 1946-49", *Journal Of Contemporary History* 25, no. 4 (1990): 489-522, doi:10.1177/002200949002500406.

was a rational choice and only dark to a small extent, since Churchill acted in a narcissistic²⁹³ manner when limiting communist expansionism.

Fundamentally, Churchill was making an irrational choice and portraying a dark side to a great extent during his strategy for the Percentage Agreement. The uncouthness, arrogance, egotism, narcissism²⁹⁴ and ignorance Churchill portrayed by dividing Eastern Europe and Balkans on a handwritten piece of paper is extraordinary. He claimed, "it was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down"²⁹⁵. Nevertheless, he was transforming millions of lives forever. Hungary, for example, was entrapped to arguably fifty years of 'enslavement'²⁹⁶ (communist regime). Despite Churchill's momentary repentance, his actions were illegitimate. Furthermore, Harriman, the excluded American ambassador, later noted the absurdity, "I don't understand now...just what Churchill thought he was accomplishing by those percentages"²⁹⁷. However, arguably Churchill was attempting to prevent friction,²⁹⁸ during a period of

²⁹³ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

²⁹⁴ P.D. Harms, Seth M. Spain and Sean T. Hannah, "Leader Development And The Dark Side Of Personality", *The Leadership Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (2011): 495-509, doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.04.007.

²⁹⁵ Churchill, Winston. *Second World War: Volume VI Triumph And Tragedy* (London: Cassell & Company, 1953), 226-228.

²⁹⁶ Richard M Langworth, *Winston Churchill, Myth And Reality: What He Actually Did And Said* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2017), 175.

²⁹⁷ Joseph M. Siracusa, "The Night Stalin And Churchill Divided Europe: The View from Washington", *The Review Of Politics* 43, no. 3 (1981): 385, doi:10.1017/s0034670500030096.

²⁹⁸ Yohanan Cohen, *Small Nations In Times Of Crisis And Confrontation* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 117.

national weakness. Carlton noted Churchill's weakness, stating he did not have 'a single decent card in his hand'. As such, he demonstrated how 'even brutal dictators' find it difficult to resist flattery²⁹⁹. Moreover, Langworth contends 'naughty deals' can work the best³⁰⁰ and Churchill recalled Stalin "never broke his word"³⁰¹, which was valid³⁰². Nevertheless, this agreement started and explicitly stated the Western allies versus Eastern dichotomization³⁰³. Yergin argues this is paradoxical, as the Iron Curtain speech denounced the division³⁰⁴, illustrating inconsistencies in Churchill's rationality. In summary, Churchill dividing millions of lives, on a piece of paper in seconds, is dark to a large extent. However, it should be acknowledged this may have been the best possible method, though, an irrational action, because Churchill was not acting vigilantly in achieving his goal of constraining communism.

Churchill deliberately excluded America from the Percentage Agreement for his own means; an irrational and significant dark action. Britain and America had strong links

²⁹⁹ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 115-117.

³⁰⁰ Richard M Langworth, *Winston Churchill, Myth And Reality: What He Actually Did And Said* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2017), 174.

³⁰¹ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 120.

³⁰² Richard M Langworth, "Stalin Never Broke His Word To Me. "Churchill's Words?", 2012, accessed April 16, 2019. <https://richardlangworth.com/stalin-1>.

³⁰³ Richard M Langworth, *Winston Churchill, Myth And Reality: What He Actually Did And Said* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2017), 175.

³⁰⁴ Robert Kaiser, "Churchill-Stalin Agreement Is Reported", *Washington Post*, 1977, accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/08/23/churchill-stalin-agreement-is-reported/aa6bce42-0798-43bda3833f7a30b4b868/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.87acled919bd.

and a 'special relationship'³⁰⁵ (popularised by Churchill) during World War Two. This intimate bond³⁰⁶ was the 'cornerstone of the modern, democratic world order'³⁰⁷. Arguably Britain was only saved from Hitler³⁰⁸, because of American military forces (12 million soldiers³⁰⁹), armaments and financial aid, which had a substantial and pivotal impact³¹⁰. Therefore, Churchill bargaining for America without its consent or knowledge shows an extremely mischievous and bold³¹¹ dark side; also, irrational. Churchill was willing to jeopardise this valuable relationship. Additionally, Roosevelt could not attend the conference, due to rallying for the presidential election³¹²,

³⁰⁵ Steve Marsh and John Baylis, "The Anglo-American "Special Relationship": The Lazarus Of International Relations", *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 1 (2006): 173-211, doi:10.1080/09592290500533841.

³⁰⁶ David Reynolds, "A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain And The International Order Since The Second World War", *International Affairs* 62, no. 1 (1985): 1-20, doi:10.2307/2618063.

³⁰⁷ Paul Johnson, *The Birth Of The Modern* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 1.

³⁰⁸ John Worthington, "Did The USA 'Save Britain's Ass' In WW2? – Uncle Sam And John Bull Slug It Out", *Abroad In The Yard*, accessed April 8, 2019, <https://www.abroadintheyard.com/did-the-usa-save-britains-ass-in-ww2/>.

³⁰⁹ Victor Hanson, "Why America Was Indispensable To The Allies' Winning World War II", *National Review*, 2015, accessed April 9, 2019. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/why-america-was-indispensable-allies-winning-world-war-ii-victor-davis-hanson/>.

³¹⁰ Robert J. Art, "The United States, The Balance Of Power, And World War II: Was Spykman Right?", *Security Studies* 14, no. 3 (2005): 365-406, doi:10.1080/09636410500323120.

³¹¹ Robert Hogan and Joyce Hogan, "Assessing Leadership: A View From The Dark Side", *International Journal Of Selection And Assessment* 9, no. 1 & 2 (2001): 40-51, doi:10.1111/1468-2389.00162.

³¹² Panos Tsakaloyannis, "The Moscow Puzzle", *Journal Of Contemporary History* 21, no. 1 (1986): 43, doi:10.1177/002200948602100103.

subsequently he sent Harriman³¹³ as a representative and observer. Consequentially, Stalin and Churchill believed they could decide the future of Eastern Europe together³¹⁴, visible, by the deliberate exclusion of Harriman from the Percentage discussions. Roosevelt anticipated this, messaging Harriman to denote his great interest in the discussions between Stalin and Churchill.³¹⁵ Moreover, Roosevelt was so suspicious of Churchill he reconciled with Stalin, to ensure total involvement in the discussions³¹⁶, in an attempt to curtail Churchill's agenda. In the absence of the Americans, Churchill professed "the moment is apt for business"³¹⁷; a treacherous manoeuvre. Jenkins emphasised Churchill was conscious of this, claiming the Americans would be shocked if they saw how crudely he had put it together.³¹⁸ Churchill reasoning centred on America's anti-imperialist stance, which contradicted his imperialistic agenda to prevent British decline³¹⁹. Although, after Roosevelt's original displeasure, he gradually accepted the Agreement; particularly on Churchill's

³¹³ Leslie Holmes, *Communism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25.

³¹⁴ Max Kuhelj Bugaric, "Birth Of The Cold War", *UCLA Historical Journal* 25, no. 1 (2014), 46.

³¹⁵ Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy To Churchill And Stalin 1941-1946* (New York: Random House, 1975), 345-355.

³¹⁶ Robert Sherwood, "The White House Papers Of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate History", *International Affairs* 25, no. 2 (1949): 825-826.

³¹⁷ Joesph Siracusa, "The Meaning Of TOLSTOY: Churchill, Stalin, And The Balkans Moscow, October 1944", *Diplomatic History* 3, no. 4 (1979): 443-444, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1979.tb00328.x.

³¹⁸ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 2001), 759.

³¹⁹ Daniel S Margolies, *A Companion To Harry S. Truman* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 420.

suggestion of a three-month trial.³²⁰ However, Churchill did not inform Stalin and there was no mention of temporality in the official minutes.³²¹ Nevertheless, American politicians believed the Agreement was 'the worst tradition of power politics'³²², whilst referring to the deal as 'notorious'³²³ and 'cynical'³²⁴. Furthermore, Bohlen thought Churchill was unrealistic, suggesting Stalin was untrustworthy.³²⁵ Conversely, according to Leffler, Churchill sought to renege.³²⁶ on the Agreement, after the war, and when Greece was secured. Overall, Churchill's Machiavellian³²⁷ dark personality is evident to a large extent, foremost by the American exclusion. It is also evidenced later with the bold and imaginative achievement of gaining American consent to a three-month trial, without Stalin's approval. Moreover, inconsistencies and Churchill's

³²⁰ David Carlton, *Churchill And The Soviet Union* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 114-116.

³²¹ Robert Kaiser, "Churchill-Stalin Agreement Is Reported", *Washington Post*, 1977, accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/08/23/churchill-stalinagreement-is-reported/aa6bce42-0798-43bd-a3833f7a30b4b868/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.87ac1ed919bd.

³²² Joseph M. Siracusa, "The Night Stalin And Churchill Divided Europe: The View From Washington", *The Review Of Politics* 43, no. 3 (1981): 385, doi:10.1017/s0034670500030096.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Ernest W. Lefever, "Witness To History, 1929–1969", *History: Reviews Of New Books* 1, no. 8 (1973): 176-176, doi:10.1080/03612759.1973.9945892.

³²⁶ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Adherence To Agreements: Yalta And The Experiences Of The Early Cold War", *International Security* 11, no. 1 (1986): 88, doi:10.2307/2538877.

³²⁷ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

self-regarded interests are irrational, because they significantly affected future outcomes, such as trust and disrupted Nash's equilibrium³²⁸, as America's preferences were not satisfied in the strategy of play.

Churchill's Percentage Agreement was deeply momentous. Naimark³²⁹ and Jenkins³³⁰ claim it cemented Eastern Europe within the Soviet Union sphere of influence³³¹. Furthermore, Roberts stipulates the deal formulated 'grandiose plans'³³² for a post war trilateral global condominium of Great Britain, the USSR and the United States. Kolko, nevertheless, plays down its significance³³³, emphasising Stalin's symbolic 'tick'³³⁴ on the agreement had little worth in practice³³⁵. Todd, however, asserts Stalin did in fact view it as equally important to Yalta³³⁶. Moreover, Bohlen, an

³²⁸ Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, *A Course In Game Theory* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2016), 14.

³²⁹ Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History Of The Cold War: Volume 1, Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 175.

³³⁰ Roy Jenkins, *Churchill* (Pan Books: London, 2002), 759-761.

³³¹ Melvyn P Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History Of The Cold War: Volume 1, Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 175.

³³² Geoffery Roberts, "Ideology, Calculation, And Improvisation: Spheres Of Influence And Soviet Foreign Policy 1939–1945", *Review Of International Studies* 25, no. 4 (1999): 655, doi:10.1017/s0260210599006555.

³³³ Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics Of War* (New York: Pantheon Book, 1990), 145.

³³⁴ Louis P Cassimatis, *American Influence In Greece 1917-1929* (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988), 240.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Allan Todd, *History For The IB Diploma Paper 3 The Soviet Union And Post-Soviet Russia (1924–2000)*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 105-111.

American diplomat, agrees its magnitude³³⁷. Nonetheless Eden, the British Foreign Minister³³⁸, understood the agreement as merely a practicality³³⁹. Significantly, the day after formalising the agreement, Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister) and Eden modified the percentages in Russia's favour³⁴⁰, regarding it as 'general rather than precise'³⁴¹. Nevertheless, Britain gained the ability to do what seemed necessary in Greece, whilst Stalin could conduct operations in Romania and Hungary without allied interference. Overall, the agreement was profoundly important for the future of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

To conclude, the Percentage Agreement was an irrational choice and illustrates Churchill's dark side to a great extent. Although Churchill was rational and dark to a small degree whilst securing Greek democracy, naval dominance, economic imperialism and limiting the spread of communism for British interests. Moreover, Churchill's imperial motives were irrational and dark to a great degree. Of most importance is the method used and the exclusion of the Americans, throughout the process, exposing Churchill's irrationality and dark side to a great extent. Churchill

³³⁷ Robert Kaiser, "Churchill-Stalin Agreement Is Reported", *Washington Post*, 1977, accessed April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/0823/churchill-stalin-agreement-is-reported/aa6bce42-0798-43bd-a383-3f7a30b4b868/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.87ac1ed919bd.

³³⁸ Panos Tsakaloyannis, "The Moscow Puzzle", *Journal Of Contemporary History* 21, no. 1 (1986): 37-55, doi:10.1177/002200948602100103.

³³⁹ Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics Of War* (New York: Pantheon Book, 1990). 145.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War To Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 218.

himself acknowledged this by referring to the agreement as the 'naughty document'³⁴². Therefore, Churchill's heroic received narrative is tarnished. The document was critically important for reshaping post war Eastern Europe and the Balkans, which had everlasting effects.

Chapter 3: Operational Unthinkable

³⁴² Eugene L Rasor, *Winston S. Churchill, 1874-1965* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 269.

When Churchill's plan for a Third World War against Russia was released into the public domain (1998³⁴³), code named Operation Unthinkable, Dilks states 'reverberations were heard from every part of the world'³⁴⁴. However, Operation Unthinkable was merely a contingency plan, hence the negative physical consequences would have been hypothetical. Churchill's seriosity is debatable. Nevertheless, Churchill's warmongering dark side is visible and diverts from his heroic received perspective. Moreover, this chapter will adopt a similar line of analysis to the Percentage Agreement, rather than the Bengal Famine, since Churchill exclusively had complete agency in ordering Operation Unthinkable. Furthermore, this chapter will summarise Operation Unthinkable. Then an analysis of Churchill's motivations and reasoning for warmongering will be presented, with the application of rational and irrational choice theory and in tandem with the dark side framework. Finally, an evaluation of its importance will be given, which will confirm Churchill's dark side to a great extent, though through rational actions.

For a complete comprehension and assessment of Churchill's dark side, a contextualisation of Operation Unthinkable is necessary. Germany's World War Two surrender was signalled on May 8th, 1945, Victory in Europe Day (VE Day), causing

³⁴³ Joel Clarke Gibbons, *The Empire Strikes A Match In A World Full Of Oil* (Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2011), 158.

³⁴⁴ David Dilks, *Churchill And Company: Allies And Rivals In War And Peace* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 201.

wild celebrations³⁴⁵ to transpire globally. Britain³⁴⁶ declared a national holiday³⁴⁷ and Churchill made a celebratory speech³⁴⁸. Though reminding people Japan was yet to be defeated, the overarching tone was jubilant. Therefore, surprisingly by May 22nd, Churchill directly ordered his war cabinet to construct a contingency offensive plan to eliminate Russia³⁴⁹ (Operation Unthinkable). This was despite British Russian international relations being perceived in de facto the friendliest³⁵⁰ and in de jure strong, because of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance (1941). Also, Britain was economically (age of austerity³⁵¹) and socially crippled³⁵², consequentially, the plan had high

³⁴⁵ Shanti Sumartojo, "Dazzling Relief': Floodlighting And National Affective Atmospheres On VE Day 1945", *Journal Of Historical Geography* 45 (2014): 59-69, doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2014.05.032.

³⁴⁶ Mel Slater, *Presence 2005* (London: University College London, 2005), 33.

³⁴⁷ "What You Need To Know About VE Day", *Imperial War Museum*, 2018, accessed April 16, 2019. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-you-need-to-know-about-ve-day>.

³⁴⁸ Winston Churchill, "The Second Great War", 1945, Historic Documents archive.

³⁴⁹ David Dilks, *Churchill And Company: Allies And Rivals In War And Peace* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 213.

³⁵⁰ Richard H Ullman, *The Anglo-Soviet Accord* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 474-478.

³⁵¹ Irene Gedalof, *Narratives Of Difference In An Age Of Austerity* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

³⁵² Stephen Blank, "Britain: The Politics Of Foreign Economic Policy, The Domestic Economy, And The Problem Of Pluralistic Stagnation", *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (1977): 673, doi:10.1017/s0020818300018658.

sensitivity. Hence the 'greatest secrecy'³⁵³ was retained, for example, documents were destroyed continuously³⁵⁴ and staff in Service Ministries³⁵⁵ were not consulted.

To sufficiently understand Churchill's dark side in Operation Unthinkable a review of its contents is essential. Operation Unthinkable treated the British Empire and America as a singular entity, as American support was recognised as necessary for any Russian attack. Moreover, the document's focused on Russian's threat to Western Civilisation, ³⁵⁶ portraying the Cold War idea of *us versus them* (West/capitalism/democracy versus East/communism), commencing the bipolar narrative. Furthermore, its objective was 'to impose upon Russia the will of the United States and British Empire'³⁵⁷. The plan assumed America and Britain would have the 'full assistance'³⁵⁸ of Polish and German armies ³⁵⁹, whilst maintaining public support³⁶⁰. The plan stated 'a quick success'³⁶¹ and 'decisive victory'³⁶² was

³⁵³ David Dilks, *Churchill And Company: Allies And Rivals In War And Peace* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 23.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ "Operation Unthinkable", Report, (2004), Public Record Office, 1, accessed April 16, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20101116155514/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm>.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

³⁶² Ibid.

required to defeat the Russians³⁶³. Furthermore, the report concluded Britain must be prepared to commit to a 'long and costly' total war³⁶⁴, though there was doubt over victory, because of land 'numerical inferiority'³⁶⁵. The plan concluded cooperation would be a more sufficient method, instead of military prowess. Overall, attention to detail throughout the document is astonishing, showing how serious Britain was about a Russian attack and the Grand Alliance's imbedded distrust, divide and suspicions.

There is controversy over the extent of Stalin's knowledge of Operation Unthinkable. Erickson³⁶⁶ claims the documents are 'illuminating'³⁶⁷, since they detail why on 29th June 1945, Soviet Commander Zhukov, with 'no apparent reason'³⁶⁸, suddenly ordered the regrouping and defensive positions in Poland; thus, suggesting they were responding to intelligence regarding Operation Unthinkable, sent from the Cambridge

³⁶³ "National Archives Learning Curve", *National Archives*, accessed March 22, 2019, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/coldwar/G2/cs3/S6_t.htm.

³⁶⁴ "Operation Unthinkable", Report, (2004), Public Record Office, 4, accessed April 16, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20101116155514/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm>.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁶⁶ Ben Fenton, "Churchill's Plan For Third World War Against Stalin", *Daily Telegraph*, 1998, accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.economicsvoodoo.com/wp-content/uploads/1998-10-01-Churchills-Plan-for-Third-World-War-againstStalin_Daily-Telegraph.pdf.

³⁶⁷ "Britain Had Plans In 1945 To Invade USSR, Paper Says", *Deseret News*, 1998, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://www.deseretnews.com/article/654932/Britain-had-plans-in-1945-to-invade-USSR-paper-says.html>.

³⁶⁸ Ben Fenton, "Churchill's Plan For Third World War Against Stalin", *Daily Telegraph*, 1998, accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.economicsvoodoo.com/wp-content/uploads/1998-10-01-Churchills-Plan-for-Third-World-War-against-Stalin_Daily-Telegraph.pdf.

Five spies to Moscow, specifically Burgess³⁶⁹. Alternatively, this movement could have been due to British Field Marshal Montgomery stockpiling German captured weaponry, causing increased Soviet suspicion and anxiety³⁷⁰. However, there is substantial evidence illustrating Russian knowledge of Operation Unthinkable³⁷¹.

Operation Unthinkable highlights Churchill's warmongering, demonstrating his irrationality and dark side to a great extent. The generals were 'gobsmacked'³⁷² when requested to create the plan; Brooke (Britain's Chief of Army Staff) explained Churchill was longing for another war³⁷³. This emphasises Churchill's all-encompassing agency and irrational problem-solving. Furthermore, Hastings suggests Churchill's satisfaction of the downfall of Nazism was almost entirely overshadowed³⁷⁴ by Russian Eastern Europe victories. Ironically, Hitler's Operation Barbarossa against Russia had many resemblances to Operation Unthinkable, especially in the desire for decisive victories at Russia's borders. Walker asserts Churchill's tyrannical plan

³⁶⁹ Andrew Lownie, *Stalin's Englishman* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2016), 168.

³⁷⁰ C Trueman, "Operation Unthinkable - History Learning Site", *History Learning Site*, 2015, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/world-war-two-in-western-europe/operation-unthinkable/>.

³⁷¹ "Frenemies - Churchill's Planned 1945 Surprise Attack On The Soviets", *Military History Now*, 2012, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://militaryhistorynow.com/2012/10/15/operation-unthinkable-churchills-planned-1945-surprise-attack-on-the-soviets/>.

³⁷² Rakesh Simha, "Operation Unthinkable: Churchill's Plan To Start World War III", *Russia Beyond*, 2013, accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.rbth.com/blogs/2013/06/13/operation_unthinkable_churchills_plan_to_start_world_war_iii_26091.

³⁷³ Alan Francis Brooke, Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, *War Diaries, 1939-1945* (London: Phoenix, 2003), xx.

³⁷⁴ Max Hastings, *Winston's War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 450.

allowed for the 'ghosts of Hitler and Napoleon' ³⁷⁵ to be never far away, ³⁷⁶ meaning Churchill's plan was irrational and belligerent, because of his conqueror at any cost approach (not adequately utility maximising). Furthermore, Roosevelt dismissed Churchill's plan ³⁷⁷, as the Americans rationally desired cooperation and communication with Stalin, above conflict, to achieve their objective of constraining of communism. Additionally, Worsthorne argues Churchill is the 'greatest British warmongering villain' ³⁷⁸ and would have been a great leader if only he had atoned for his actions ³⁷⁹. Moreover, Truchanovskij claims Churchill was a dictator, whom wanted to rule over Europe ³⁸⁰; Operation Unthinkable parallels this narrative. This emphasises Churchill's dark narcissistic and arguably psychopathic warmongering behaviour ³⁸¹. Overall, the reaction of British generals and America suggest Churchill

³⁷⁵ Jonathan Walker, "Operation Unthinkable – Churchill's Plans To Invade The Soviet Union", *The History Press*, accessed March 23, 2019, <https://www.thehistorypress.co.uk/articles/operation-unthinkable-churchill-s-plans-to-invade-the-soviet-union/>.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Yuriy Rubtsov, "World War II: "Operation Unthinkable", Churchill's Planned Invasion of The Soviet Union, July 1945", *Global Research*, 2015, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://www.globalresearch.ca/world-war-ii-operation-unthinkable-churchills-planned-invasion-of-the-soviet-union-july-1945/5451842>.

³⁷⁸ "Winston Churchill: British Hero Or Racist Villain?", *The Week UK*, 2019, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://www.theweek.co.uk/62209/winston-churchill-greatest-british-hero-or-warmongering-villain>.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ V Jevič and G Truchanovskij, *Winston Churchill*, 1st ed. (Praha: Svoboda, 1986), 318.

³⁸¹ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

had complete agency and acted irrationally, whilst his warmongering portrays a dark side to a great extent.

Operation Unthinkable can be argued as rational and indubitably justifiable, because of the pending American military European departure; therefore, Churchill had a dark side to a small degree. Operation Unthinkable reports 6 million³⁸² Russian soldiers were situated in Europe³⁸³. Comparatively, British military capability had 1.32 million and plans to reduce to 448,000 post VE day³⁸⁴. Also, in 1945 there were 3.1 million Americans in Europe; by 1946, 391,000³⁸⁵. Whereas the Russian army and their industries continued to grow³⁸⁶. Nevertheless, military manpower was important, but so was location. Britain and America had troops in undisputed areas in Western Europe, whilst Russia had soldiers spanning the conquered undefined Eastern territories³⁸⁷. This caused a restriction of British negotiation power and strategy, which

³⁸² "Operation Unthinkable", Report, (2004), Public Record Office, 17, accessed April 16, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20101116155514/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm>.

³⁸³ Reina Pennington, "Was The Russian Military A Steamroller? From World War II To Today", *War On The Rocks*, 2016, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/was-the-russian-military-a-steamroller-from-world-war-ii-to-today/>.

³⁸⁴ Richard Bitzinger, *Assessing The Conventional Balance In Europe, 1945-1975* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2019), 5, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/ N2859.pdf>.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ NATO Information Service, *NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty organisation*, Paris, 1962, 4.

³⁸⁷ "The Eastern Front", *The National WWII Museum*, 2017, accessed April 17, 2019. <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/eastern-front>.

would be further exasperated after America departed. Consequently, as Churchill persuaded the Empire and British to fight for democracy, human rights and against tyranny³⁸⁸, Churchill's objective was to limit Soviet influence. Therefore, Churchill needed to act and plan immediately; thus, a rational choice. Exasperated, Churchill, in February 1945, painted a metaphorical picture of the situation, with 'the big Russian bear'³⁸⁹, 'the great American elephant'³⁹⁰ and between the two, 'the poor little British donkey'³⁹¹. This shows Churchill's acknowledgement of British comparative impending weakness. Churchill went on to summarise, after the American withdrawal to the Pacific War, the Russians would have the power to advance to the North Sea and Atlantic³⁹². He asserted, in this situation, "Pray have a study made of how then we could defend our island."³⁹³ Overall, American European withdrawal would disrupt the balance of power, leaving Britain vulnerable and enabling Europe to be at Stalin's mercy³⁹⁴. Hence, Operation Unthinkable was a rational and justifiable choice to minimise hypothetical future costs. However, this was also to preserve recognition,

³⁸⁸ Geoffery Best, "World Wars: Winston Churchill: Defender Of Democracy", *BBC*, 2011, accessed April 17, 2019. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/churchill_defender_01.shtml.

³⁸⁹ Rakesh Simha, "Operation Unthinkable: Churchill's Plan To Start World War III", *Russia Beyond*, 2013, accessed April 17, 2019. https://www.rbth.com/blogs/2013/06/13/operation_unthinkable_churchills_plan_to_start_world_war_iii_26091.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid..

³⁹² Max Hastings, *Winston's War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 22.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin And The Militarization Of The Cold War", *International Security* 9, no. 3 (1984): 109, doi:10.2307/2538589.

power and tradition.³⁹⁵, often associated with a dark side. Nevertheless, for the purpose of protection and stability, his dark side could be seen to a small extent.

Poland was symbolic for Britain, to prevent Soviet domination and oppression. Operation Unthinkable was, therefore, an inevitable rational choice that presented Churchill's dark side to a small extent. Poland was emblematic for Britain, since Britain entered World War Two (1939) to defend Poland. This protection was due to the Anglo-Polish mutual military agreement (1939)³⁹⁶. Furthermore, 228,000 (1945)³⁹⁷ Polish soldiers served with the British Army³⁹⁸. Subsequently, Britain became attached and believed it was its duty to protect Poland. This attitude was supported by Churchill, whom proudly addressed the House of Commons declaring his personal desire to honour the wishes of His Majesty's Government by ensuring 'the creation and maintenance of a strong integral independent Poland'³⁹⁹. He emphasised that he would never weaken in his resolve⁴⁰⁰. Although, during the Warsaw Uprising (1944),

³⁹⁵ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

³⁹⁶ Jerzy Jan Lerski, Piotr Wrobel and Richard Kozicki, *Historical Dictionary Of Poland, 966-1945* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998).

³⁹⁷ Mark Ostrowski, "'Our March Is Towards Poland, Whole, Free And Independent" - The Origins Of The Polish Armed Forces Question.", 1996, accessed April 18, 2019. <http://www.angelfire.com/ok2/polisharmy/chapter1.html>.

³⁹⁸ Barbara Szacka, "Polish Remembrance Of World War II", *International Journal Of Sociology* 36, no. 4 (2006): 8-26, doi:10.2753/ijis0020-7659360401.

³⁹⁹ Winston Churchill, "Poland", *Api Parliament Uk*, 1944, accessed April 19, 2019. <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1944/dec/15/poland>.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

the Red Army deliberately halted to allow the German's to regroup and demolish Warsaw⁴⁰¹; consequently, 200,000 Polish died⁴⁰², with \$54.6 billion⁴⁰³ worth of damage, despite Churchill pleading for increased support from Roosevelt and Stalin, which was rejected⁴⁰⁴. Noteworthy, during the inception of Operation Unthinkable, a number of Polish democratic political leaders 'disappeared'⁴⁰⁵. This was evident in the Trials of Sixteen (1945)⁴⁰⁶, where democrats were falsely charged by Soviets. Astonishingly, Churchill had knowledge of the concealed Kaytn Massacre (1940), where Soviets murdered 22,000 Polish elites⁴⁰⁷. These events proved the Soviets were untrustworthy. Additionally, Stalin anticipated Poland would be a communist 'puppet'⁴⁰⁸ state, at Yalta when Molotov expressed his concerns of the concessions. Stalin replied, "Never mind. We'll do it our own way later"⁴⁰⁹. This proved Stalin had

⁴⁰¹ Gloria Lotha, "Warsaw Uprising", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2019, accessed April 19, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Uprising>.

⁴⁰² Andrew Borowiec, *Destroy Warsaw!* (Westport: Praeger, 2001), 179.

⁴⁰³ "Warsaw Uprising: 1944", *Warsaw Insider*, 2018, accessed April 19, 2019. <http://www.warsawinsider.pl/warsaw-uprising-1944/>.

⁴⁰⁴ Halik Kochanski, *Poland And The Poles In The Second World War* (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 417-418.

⁴⁰⁵ Michael Peck, "Operation Unthinkable: Britain's Secret Plan To Invade Russia In 1945", *The National Interest*, 2017, accessed April 19, 2019. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/operation-unthinkable-britains-secret-plan-invade-russia-22521>.

⁴⁰⁶ Norman Davies, *Europe At War 1939-1945* (London: Pan Books, 2007), 195.

⁴⁰⁷ Laurence Rees, *World War II Behind Closed Doors* (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 237-245.

⁴⁰⁸ Ziven Chinburg, "National Identity, Historical Narratives, And The Fate Of Poland In World War II", *Honours Projects* 54 (2016): 7.

⁴⁰⁹ Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts, *Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-Creation Of World War II Through The Eyes And Minds Of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, And Stalin* (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2007), 206.

no intention of executing his agreement. Even though Stalin agreed to have free and fair elections in Poland⁴¹⁰, after the Red Army controlled Poland, they installed the Lublin Government (July 1944)⁴¹¹; namely, a Soviet sponsored government, responsible for killing 1 million Poles (1945-1948) whom resisted⁴¹². Therefore, an attack would be logical to halt the oppression. Cienciala states Churchill had done as much as he could to acquire a 'fair deal' ⁴¹³ for Poland without utilising military prowess⁴¹⁴. Overall, Churchill was rational by formulating Operation Unthinkable, to optimise future values of the Polish people, which were high on the British hierarchy of preferences. If British adopted the 'free rider'⁴¹⁵ approach, subsequently collective action would have not taken place to protect Poland. However, Churchill's diligence and dutifulness⁴¹⁶ were being taken to the extreme resembling a dark side, but only

⁴¹⁰ "The End Of WWII And The Division Of Europe", *Centres Of European Studies*, accessed March 31, 2019, <https://europe.unc.edu/the-end-of-wwii-and-the-division-of-europe/>.

⁴¹¹ Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, *A Concise History Of Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 271.

⁴¹² Hans Schoenberg, *Germans From The East* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 3.

⁴¹³ Anna Cienciala, "Great Britain And Poland Before And After Yalta (1943-1945): A Reassessment", *The Polish Review* 40, no. 3 (1985): 281-313.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Will H. Moore, "Rational Rebels: Overcoming The Free-Rider Problem", *Political Research Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (1995): 417, doi:10.2307/449077.

⁴¹⁶ Robert Hogan and Joyce Hogan, "Assessing Leadership: A View From The Dark Side", *International Journal Of Selection And Assessment* 9, no. 1 & 2 (2001): 40-51, doi:10.1111/1468-2389.00162.

to a small extent as Churchill was showing the light triad element of humanism was prevailing⁴¹⁷.

Operation Unthinkable was a necessary rational precautionary measure due to Russian historic distrust; thus, portraying Churchill's dark side to a small extent. Despite the formation of the Anglo-Soviet alliance (1941) as recently as 1939, Russia cooperated with Britain's enemy (Germany), during the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact⁴¹⁸, a non-aggression pact. Moreover, there was a hidden, 'secret protocol'⁴¹⁹, dividing Eastern Europe; henceforth the likelihood of future disputes was high. Remarkably, prior to this treaty, Britain and France had been negotiating with Russia concerning a tripartite alliance, before Russia consulted Germany. Therefore, Britain was suspicious of a reoccurrence of this mistrust. However, history is predominantly westernised⁴²⁰, which consequentially neglects Russian opposition towards the French and British acceptance of German occupation of Sudetanland (a territory of Czechoslovakia) in the Munich Agreement (1938)⁴²¹. This shows Russia was

⁴¹⁷ Scott Barry Kaufman et al., "The Light Vs. Dark Triad Of Personality: Contrasting Two Very Different Profiles Of Human Nature", *Frontiers In Psychology* 10 (2019), doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00467.

⁴¹⁸ Gabriel Gorodetsky, "The Impact Of The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact On The Course Of Soviet Foreign Policy", *Cahiers Du Monde Russe Et Soviétique* 31, no. 1 (1990): 27-41, doi:10.3406/cmr.1990.2200.

⁴¹⁹ Derek Watson, "The Nazi-Soviet Pact And After 1939–1941", *Studies In Russian And East European History And Society* 10 (2005): 166-186.

⁴²⁰ Theodore H. Von Laue, "The World Revolution Of Westernization", *The History Teacher* 20, no. 2 (1987): 263, doi:10.2307/493032.

⁴²¹ Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Nazism 1919-1945*, 2nd ed. (Devon: University of Exeter Press, 2010), 673.

attempting to protect itself from European threats through the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Additionally, Carr argues Russia was merely trying to buy time, since Russian forces were depleted and outnumbered compared to Germany,⁴²² meaning Stalin's realpolitik approach⁴²³ was necessary. Conversely, until 1941, Dilks contends the Russians supplied the 'German war machine, partitioned Poland, attacked Finland and annexed the Baltic States'⁴²⁴, conveying an anti-western attitude and approach. Overall, Operation Unthinkable was rational, because history dictates Russia was untrustworthy. Although a similar argument could be made about Britain by Russia. Churchill was seeking security⁴²⁵, which is associated with a dark side to a small extent. However, he reverted to violence as the only method of achieving his objectives⁴²⁶.

Beforehand, Churchill was fearful of a Russian Japanese alliance, because Russia did not formally declare war with Japan till 8th August 1945, making Operation Unthinkable a rational choice and showing Churchill's dark side to a moderate extent. Operation

⁴²² E. H. Carr, "From Munich To Moscow", *Soviet Studies* 1, no. 1 (1949): 3-17, doi:10.1080/09668134908409726.

⁴²³ Ilya Gaiduk, "Stalin: Three Approaches To One Phenomenon", *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 1 (1999): 115-125, doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00158.

⁴²⁴ David Dilks, *Churchill And Company: Allies And Rivals In War And Peace* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 202.

⁴²⁵ Adrian Furnham, Gillian Hyde and Geoff Trickey, "The Dark Side Of Career Preference: Dark Side Traits, Motives, And Values", *Journal Of Applied Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (2014): 106-114, doi:10.1111/jasp.12205.

⁴²⁶ Rebecca Twinley and Gareth Addidle, "Considering Violence: The Dark Side Of Occupation", *British Journal Of Occupational Therapy* 75, no. 4 (2012): 202-204, doi:10.4276/030802212x13336366278257.

Unthinkable detailed how Russia would 'ally herself with Japan',⁴²⁷ conveying the western realism of an alliance. Moreover, Russia signed a five-year neutrality non-aggression pact with Japan, two months before Japan allied with Germany,⁴²⁸ showing historical scepticism. Also, Russia had never been attacked by Japan during World War Two, because the Japanese were afraid after their crushing defeat at Battles of Khalkhin Gol (1939).⁴²⁹ Therefore, Russia did not officially declare war.⁴³⁰, until after the Hiroshima nuclear bomb (August 6th, 1945), then only because Russia did not wish to sacrifice its Asian influence to the West. Though Hasegawa argues the primarily objective was imperial territorial expansion.⁴³¹ However, Russia adhered to the Tehran (1943) and Yalta (1945) agreements of a three-month timeline, after Germany's surrender before the Japanese invasion. Additionally, Western historians often misrepresent the importance of Russia's major role in the Japanese downfall,⁴³²

⁴²⁷ "Operation Unthinkable", Report, (2004), Public Record Office, 1, accessed April 16, 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20101116155514/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm>.

⁴²⁸ "Japan And USSR Sign Nonaggression Pact", *History*, 2018, accessed April 1, 2019. <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japan-and-ussr-sign-nonaggression-pact>.

⁴²⁹ "The Strange Alliance And The Onset Of Cold War", *Austin Community College*, accessed April 1, 2019, <http://www.austincc.edu/lpatrick/his1302/strange.html>.

⁴³⁰ "Soviets Declare War On Japan; Invade Manchuria", *History*, 2018, accessed April 2, 2019. <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/soviets-declare-war-on-japan-invade-manchuria>.

⁴³¹ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Soviet Policy Toward Japan During World War II", *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 52, no. 522-3 (2011): 245-272, doi:10.4000/monderusse.7533.

⁴³² Ward Wilson, "The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan ... Stalin Did", *Foreign Policy*, 2013, accessed April 2, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/>.

due to overemphasis on Western atomic bombs⁴³³. Summarising, Russian delay in declaring war against Japan caused suspicions, hence justifying the rational choice of Operation Unthinkable. Although, the availability of hindsight aids the conclusion that Britain should have not been suspicious, yet rational choice is only predictive. Moreover, Churchill's dark side was shown to a moderate extent because of his Machiavellianism⁴³⁴. Churchill constructed a physical plan, based on his suspicion of the Russians. As a consequence, Russia should have been equally suspicious of him.

Operation Unthinkable arose out of Churchill's personal hatred for communism. From a self-interest perspective, this is rational. Additionally, this presents Churchill's dark side to a large extent. Churchill's speeches were often a facade⁴³⁵ to disguise his real personal, dark motivations⁴³⁶, particularly his despise of communism. Kitchen argues Churchill only allied against Nazi Germany with Stalin, as he 'detested'⁴³⁷ them less.

⁴³³ Terry Charman, "How Churchill, Roosevelt And Stalin Planned To End The Second World War", *Imperial War Museum*, 2018, accessed April 2, 2019. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-churchill-roosevelt-and-stalin-planned-to-end-the-second-world-war>.

⁴³⁴ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

⁴³⁵ "His Speeches: How Churchill Did It", *The International Churchill Society*, accessed April 4, 2019, <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/speeches-about-winston-churchill/his-speeches-how-churchill-did-it/>.

⁴³⁶ "The Churchillian", *The National Churchill Museum* 4, no. 2 (2013): 23.

⁴³⁷ Martin Kitchen, "Winston Churchill And The Soviet Union During The Second World War", *The Historical Journal* 30, no. 02 (1987): 415, doi:10.1017/s0018246x00021506.

Churchill claimed that 'if Hitler invaded hell he would sign a pact with the devil'⁴³⁸; namely Russia. This portrays his rational choice by ordering an hierarchy of alternatives to achieve his optimal goal (defeat of Germany). Moreover, Churchill⁴³⁹ claimed socialism was 'the philosophy of failure, the creed of ignorance, and the gospel of envy'⁴⁴⁰. He went on to suggest the Bolsheviks were 'crocodiles'⁴⁴¹, whom he could not 'feel the slightest trust or confidence in'⁴⁴². This illustrates Churchill's passionate dislike for communism. Additionally, Churchill claimed Russia only had a 'cold policy of self-interest'⁴⁴³. However, Operation Unthinkable adhered to this depiction, where both actors are rationally operating for their own self-interest, as they are methodologically individualistic utility maximisers. Overall, Churchill's personal and ideological self-regard, influencing Operation Unthinkable, is narcissistic⁴⁴⁴, showing Churchill's dark side to a great extent.

⁴³⁸ Dwight Zimmerman, "Churchill's Deal with The Devil: The Anglo-Soviet Agreement Of 1941", *Defense Media Network*, 2011, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.defensemедianetwork.com/stories/churchills-deal-with-the-devil/>.

⁴³⁹ Martin Gilbert, *Churchill: A Life* (London: Pimlico, 2000), 774.

⁴⁴⁰ Winston Churchill, *Churchill, Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 & 1948* (London: Cassell & Company, 1950), 347.

⁴⁴¹ "Churchill On Russia", *The International Churchill Society*, accessed April 3, 2019, <https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-150/churchill-on-russia/>.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ Martin Gilbert, *Finest Hour* (London: Minerva, 1991), 50.

⁴⁴⁴ Delroy L Paulhus and Kevin M Williams, "The Dark Triad Of Personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, And Psychopathy", *Journal Of Research In Personality* 36, no. 6 (2002): 556-563, doi:10.1016/s0092-6566(02)00505-6.

The cataclysmic implications after World War Two acknowledges Churchill's creation of a new Total War as dark, to a great extent, and irrational. Britain was profoundly affected by World War Two. Not only were there 450,700 deaths⁴⁴⁵, the country bore mental and physical scars⁴⁴⁶, with families at last being reunited. Furthermore, Britain was 'bankrupt',⁴⁴⁷ owing \$4.2 billion to foreign creditors⁴⁴⁸. Additionally, rationing was still present until 1954⁴⁴⁹ and the Luftwaffe bombing had significantly affected infrastructure (1.7 million London buildings were damaged)⁴⁵⁰. However, unemployment⁴⁵¹ in Britain was lower than ever before⁴⁵². Overall, the war was

⁴⁴⁵ "Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths In World War II", *The National WWII Museum*, accessed April 4, 2019, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-worldwide-deaths-world-war>.

⁴⁴⁶ Rochelle Frounfelder et al., "Civilians In World War II And DSM-IV Mental Disorders: Results From The World Mental Health Survey Initiative", *Social Psychiatry And Psychiatric Epidemiology* 53, no. 2 (2017): 207-219, doi:10.1007/s00127-017-1452-3.

⁴⁴⁷ Jari Eloranta and Jeremy Land, "Britain's Public Debt And Seven Years War "Hollow Victory?", *Essays In Economic & Business History* 29 (2011): 111.

⁴⁴⁸ "Britain To Make Its Final Payment On World War II Loan From U.S.", *New York Times*, 2006, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-nazi.4042453.html>.

⁴⁴⁹ "Housewives Celebrate End Of Rationing", *BBC*, 2005, accessed April 4, 2019. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/newsid_3818000/3818563.stm.

⁴⁵⁰ Betsy Mason, "Bomb-Damage Maps Reveal London's World War II Devastation", *National Geographic*, 2016, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2016/05/18/bomb-damage-maps-reveal-londons-world-war-ii-devastation/>.

⁴⁵¹ Alex Cousley, Peter Siminski and Simon Ville, "The Effects Of World War II Military Service: Evidence From Australia", *The Journal Of Economic History* 77, no. 03 (2017): 838-865, doi:10.1017/s0022050717000717.

⁴⁵² Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin, "Unemployment And Unemployment Benefits In Twentieth-Century Britain: A Reply To Our Critics", *Journal Of Political Economy* 90, no. 2 (1982): 410-436, doi:10.1086/261065.

drawing to an end and Britain was attempting to recover from the economic and social perils. Therefore, Churchill's planning for another war is incongruous, unempathetic, mischievousness and inconsiderate.⁴⁵³; hence dark to a great extent. Operation Unthinkable was an irrational choice, as a new war would have had huge implicating costs.

Operation Unthinkable was not vitally important contextually, but evidently revealed Churchill's dark side. The plan was merely a hypothetical contingency. In reality, planning is not coherent with an actual physical attack. Additionally, Walker⁴⁵⁴ argues the document was merely hidden in a draw⁴⁵⁵. However, this might be because Operation Unthinkable concluded there was an unrealistic chance of success.⁴⁵⁶; therefore, illogical to enforce. Furthermore, Stalin would have become increasingly paranoid and distrustful of the West⁴⁵⁷ after collecting intelligence on these documents. Particularly, as Operation Unthinkable was the first plan for war against

⁴⁵³ Robert Hogan and Joyce Hogan, "Assessing Leadership: A View From The Dark Side", *International Journal Of Selection And Assessment* 9, no. 1 & 2 (2001): 40-51, doi:10.1111/1468-2389.00162.

⁴⁵⁴ Jonathan Walker, *Operation Unthinkable* (Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2017), 159.

⁴⁵⁵ Jonathan. Walker "Operation Unthinkable – Churchill's Plans To Invade The Soviet Union", *The History Press*, accessed March 23, 2019, <https://www.thehistorypress.co.uk/articles/operation-unthinkable-churchill-s-plans-to-invade-the-soviet-union/>.

⁴⁵⁶ Sheeraz Raza, "Russia And The USA: World War 3 And Operation Unthinkable", *Value Walk*, 2015, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.valuewalk.com/2015/12/russia-world-war-3-operation-unthinkable/>.

⁴⁵⁷ Palle Roslyng-Jensen, "From World War To Cold War: Scandinavian Media Attitudes To The Soviet Union 1945–1948", *Scandinavian Journal Of History* 37, no. 4 (2012): 526-548, doi:10.1080/03468755.2012.708260.

the Soviets, post-World War Two⁴⁵⁸. This would have lasting future affects when reshaping Europe and arguably a Cold War trigger and certainly a catalyst. Although, Russia similarly had a plan, namely Seven Days to the River Rhine, which was a nuclear war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO⁴⁵⁹. However, the fact this was produced in 1979 shows the minimal influence of Operation Unthinkable. Overall, Churchill's intent was evident but, when he realised an attack was impractical, he conceded. Therefore, Operation Unthinkable was insignificant, but undoubtedly showed Churchill's dark side.

In conclusion, despite the rational classification of Operation Unthinkable, Churchill's dark side was visible to a great extent. These rational justifications show dark connotations to a minor degree during the American European departure, protection of Poland and Russian historical distrust. Also, rational fear of Russia allying Japan illustrated a dark side to a moderate level. Overall, Churchill's warmongering, inconsideration of the effects of World War Two (irrational choice) and hatred for communism (rational choice) highlights Churchill's dark side to a great extent in Operation Unthinkable. However, it was never implemented and merely a plan; hence its contextual importance is limited. Though if the plan had a realistic chance of victory, then the results would have been catastrophic. Correspondingly, ordering the planning for another total war, evidently portrays a historical revisionist perspective of Churchill.

⁴⁵⁸ Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 336.

⁴⁵⁹ Henry Samuel, "Soviet Plan For WW3 Nuclear Attack Unearthed", *Telegraph*, 2007, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1563692/Soviet-plan-for-WW3-nuclear-attack-unearthed.html>.

Conclusion

Rigorous assessment and analysis of multiple sources, testing the boundaries of the revisionist perspective, has led this study to conclude that Churchill did indeed have a dark side to a great extent during 1942-1945. Additionally, this research deduces Churchill's received narrative is somewhat misleading and incongruent with certain actions and events.

Rational and irrational choice theories and dark side frameworks have been used to assess Churchill's dark side. However, a person's rationality for their actions is subject to debate and can be rather controversial. A criticism of rational choice theory is that not all social phenomena are reducible to rationality⁴⁶⁰; many actions do not adhere to the self-utility maximisation process. By extending this theory to incorporate irrational choice for analysing Churchill, has allowed for actions to be categorised into either rational or irrational. Moreover, rational actions have helped to legitimise his dark side. The research has revealed that Churchill actions were often dark, though were deemed necessary for achieving greater future value.

Overall, this dissertation concludes Churchill acted rationally during the Bengal Famine and Operation Unthinkable, though irrationally concerning the Percentage Agreement. Combining rational and irrational choice theories has greatly aided the

⁴⁶⁰ Michael I. Ogu, "Rational Choice Theory: Assumptions, Strengths, And Greatest Weaknesses In Application Outside The Western Milieu Context", *Nigerian Chapter Of Arabian Journal Of Business And Management Review* 1, no. 3 (2013): 90-99, doi:10.12816/0003628.

research and is recommended for future studies, when analysing the legitimacy of actors.

Many events influenced this research. The Bengal Famine had the greatest impact, since 3 million people died⁴⁶¹, followed by the Percentage Agreement, where Southern and Eastern European lives were forced into Western or Soviet spheres. Finally, Operation Unthinkable has had a major influence on this study and can perhaps be seen as the most important, in terms of analysing and deducing Churchill's dark side. Operation Unthinkable was a catastrophic plan for another total war though, fortunately, was never actually implemented. This dissertation has shown that he had complete agency during Operational Unthinkable and the Percentage Agreement, whereas only playing a contributory role in the Bengal Famine.

In reality, reviewed alone, these events tarnish Churchill's legacy. However, Churchill's lighter side is extremely elevated in the public domain, hence his legacy is damaged to a minimal degree. Moreover, this dissertation concludes that although Churchill had a dark side, he is also regarded as a 'prophet'⁴⁶². Uncovering the two sides to Churchill, has led to the conclusion that he is certainly not as dark as Hitler'⁴⁶³

⁴⁶¹ M Lufakharul Islam, "The Great Bengal Famine And The Question Of FAD Yet Again", *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (2007): 421-440, doi:10.1017/s0026749x06002435.

⁴⁶² Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill* (Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 2009), 43-66.

⁴⁶³ Maya Oppenheim and Shashi Tharoor, "Winston Churchill Is No Better Than Hitler, Says Indian MP", *The Independent*, 2018, accessed April 4, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/world-history/winston-churchill-adolf-hitler-no-better-shashi-tharoor-indian-politician-post-colonialist-author-a7641681.html>

nor Stalin.⁴⁶⁴ and can be heralded for some of his actions, particularly in World War Two.

It would be helpful to extend this research in the future. The light side of Churchill, in the 1942-1945 timeframe, should be analysed deeply to provide a full comparison. This analysis would focus on placing Churchill on a scale from light to dark and against past and present leaders. This dissertation's findings would prove a useful tool to facilitate this process.

Finally, Churchill's heroism is acknowledged, and he can indeed be remembered throughout history for this. This dissertation however confirms his dark hidden side and the sacrifices he made to achieve his legacy.

Word Count: 11,878

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

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